DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 345 985 SO 022 091

AUTHOR Smith, Michael C., Ed.
TITLE Proceedings of the Annual Conference of the Midwest Philosophy of Education Society (Chicago, Illinois, November 11-12, 1983).
INSTITUTION Midwest Philosophy of Education Society.
PUB DATE 84
NOTE 121p.; For related documents, see SO 022 089-093 and ED 319 670.
PUB TYPE Collected Works - Conference Proceedings (021)

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC05 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS Anti Intellectualism; *Curriculum Design; *Educational History; *Educational Philosophy; *Educational Responsibility; Ideology; Liberal Arts; Progressive Education; Teaching Methods

ABSTRACT

Eight papers addressing issues in the philosophy of education are featured in this document. These include: (1) "The Relation of 'The Paideia Proposal' and Ortega's Philsosphy of Education" (A. Donoso); (2) "Adler: Ideological Imperialist" (G. W. Stickel); (3) "Anti-Intellectualism and 'The Paideia Proposal'" (D. G. Smith); (4) "Intellectual Capacities and the Liberal Arts" (R. B. Nordberg); (5) "Mortimer Adler and the Progressive Tradition" (A. R. McAninch); (6) "Student Choices and a Standardized Curriculum Reconsidered" (R. Swartz); (7) "Classical Living and Classical Learning: The Search for Equity and Excellence" (P. L. Smith; R. Traver); and (8) "Disbelief in the Classroom: Second Thoughts" (W. P. Krolikowski). The document also contains a list of the Society's officers and committees, minutes of the business meeting, and the treasure's report. (KM)

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PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE

MIDWEST PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY

1983

Edited

by

Michael C. Smith
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

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Dues are collected yearly at the Annual Meeting, or by mail.

ANNUAL CONFERENCE

MIDWEST PHILOSOPHY

OF EDUCATION

SOCIETY

CONFERENCE

NOVEMBER 11-12, 1983

University of Chicago

Chicago, Illinois

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Proceedings of the Mid-West Philosophy of Education Society officially serves as a record of the scholarly dialog exchanged at the Annual Conference. thus the record of these outstanding presentations is made available to other scholars, philosophers, and educators, who were not able to attend the regional meeting. The Proceedings have been published since 1977 and the Society itself has held annual conferences for more than twenty years.

The success of the 1983 Conference can be attributed to the inspiration and hard work of the Program Committee: namely, Lawrence Dennis, Alex Makedon, and Timothy Reagan; and our hosts Walter Krolikowski and Charles Bidwell. Thanks and much appreciation from the Society are well deserved.

Toward the publication of these Proceedings, I would like to thank former Dean Michael J. Stolee, School of Education, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, as well as his successor Dean Sam J. Yarger, for scholarly commitment and financial support. And of course, there would be no production of these Proceedings without competent and professional assistance of people like Cathy Mae Nelson and Kristine M. Benz.

Michael C. Smith

ANNUAL CONFERENCE

MIDWEST PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY

November 11-12, 1983
University of Chicago
Chicago, Illinois

Program

Friday, November 11, 1983

12:00-1:00 p.m. Reception

First Session

1:00-2:15 p.m.

Chair: Lawrence J. Dennis, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale

"Relation of The Paideia Proposal and Ortega's Philosophy of Education" — Anton Donoso, University of Detroit

2:30-3:30 p.m.

Chair: Alexander Makedon, Institute of Modern Greek Studies

Panel

"Auxiliary Studies as Viewed in The Paideia Proposal" — D. G. Mulcahy, University of Florida

"Adler: Intellectual Imperialist" — George W. Stickel, Northwestern College

"Anti-Intellectualism and The Paideia Proposal" — Don G. Smith, Southern Illinois Univ. at Carbondale

"Intellectual Capacity and the Liberal Arts" — Robert B. Nordberg, Marquette University

3:45-4:15 p.m.

"Mortimer Adler and the Progressive Tradition" — Amy C. Raths, University of Illinois

"Student Choice and a Standardized Reconsidered" — Ronald Swartz, Oakland University

4:15-5:15 p.m.

Discussion of Papers

5:30-6:00 p.m.

Business Meeting — Philip J. Smith, The Ohio State Univ.

Saturday, November 12, 1983

9:00-9:30 a.m. Coffee

Second Session

9:30-12:00 p.m.

Chair: Timothy Reagan, University of Illinois

Speakers

"Classical Living and Classical Learning" — Rob Traver and Philip L. Smith, The Ohio State Univ.

"Some Careful Comments on Creativity" — Robert P. Craig, St. Mary's College

"Disbelief in the Classroom: Second Thoughts" — Walter P. Krolikowski, Loyola University of Chicago

The Relation of The Paideia Proposal and Ortega's Philosophy of Education

by
Anton Donoso

Although no mention of José Ortega y Gasset (1883-1955) is made in The Paideia Proposal, An Educational Manifesto, Mortimer Adler has declared publicly that the document attempts to realize the educational ideals of the Spanish writer-philosopher. The occasion of this declaration was the symposium, "José Ortega y Gasset in Twentieth Century Thought," sponsored by the Hispanic Division of the Library of Congress and the Ortega y Gasset Foundation of Madrid in Washington, D.C. on September 30 and October 1, 1982. The symposium honored Ortega as much as publicized the recently acquired microfilm of the archives of Ortega by the Library of Congress.[1] Listed in the program as speaking on "Ortega and Education," Adler entitled his paper "Ortega y Gasset: The Educators of the 20th Century." Even apart from the usual exaggerated adulation of the honoree at such events, Adler apparently does view Ortega as the educator of the 20th century, at least in regard to the Western world, and looks to the adoption and adaptation of his philosophy of education as precisely what is needed to bring about a radical reform of the twelve years of compulsory basic schooling in the United States. In this paper I propose to devote most of the time to a report of Adler's statements on the relationship of The Paideia Proposal and Ortega's philosophy of education, ending with contextual material on Ortega that Adler of necessity omitted and a comment on Adler's adoption and adaptation of Ortega.

Although Adler considers himself merely "the nominal author" of The Paideia Proposal, I shall refer only to him in discussing the manifesto's position. I have no way of knowing if others in the twenty-two member Paideia Group read or reread Ortega as did Adler during the two years of conferences that produced the work, and if they did, whether they are as enthusiastic about Ortega's philosophy of education as apparently is Adler. If the Paideia group would have gone beyond the shores of these United States in dedicating the book they would have dedicated it, according to Adler's speech, first and foremost to José Ortega y Gasset. As it was, the book is dedicated to three Americans who improved our educational system and who, were they now alive, would be leading the reform movement in education: to Horace Mann, for his fight for the extension of free public schooling as indispensable to a democracy; to John Dewey, for his insistence that all children in a democratic society, given their common futures, require the same quality of schooling; and to Robert M. Hutchins, for his commitment that the best education for the best is the best education for all. Ortega's insights into education are, according to Adler, even more fundamental than those of the three Americans, for they are insights that go to the very heart of the problem of education in our century, namely, how to preserve culture so as to prevent the rise of a new barbarism.

The systematic presentation by Adler at the Library of Congress symposium consisted of three parts. He began by stating the three insights of Ortega that he considers of "great importance" to him. There followed an elaboration of the insights and, as a conclusion, an

indication of how The Paideia Proposal attempts "to realize the educational ideals Ortega had in mind." Also included was the interesting fact that the Aspen Institute of Humanistic Studies developed as a result of a letter Ortega wrote in 1949. (In order not to run together Adler's presentation with my contextual material, I shall summarzie first his statements.)

The first insight of Ortega concerns the ever-increasing specialization that has characterized learning in the twentieth century. The second insight deals with Ortega's identification of a generalist approach to education with the study of the humanities, rather than his considering the humanities as each a separate and specialized discipline as is customary today. For Ortega, as for Adler, there are two approaches to any body of subject matter or field of learning, namely, the generalist and the specialist. Both are necessary but specialization should begin after a general education. Ortega's third insight is that, although not everyone should specialize, for example in physics or biology or history, everyone should acquire some general understanding of the physical world, living organisms and the development of human institutions. As we shall soon see, this general understanding is what makes a person, for Ortega, cultured. Adler points out that this third insight of Ortega is not as clear as the others because it bears traces of an elitism that was "natural to the man and his times."

In elaborating the three insights Adler begins by reminding us that the highest tribute that can be paid anyone who has formulated an idea is the adoption and appropriate use of the idea by others. It is at this

point that he gives a brief account of how this tribute has been paid Ortega by those who are trying to reform American education. Adler recalled that in an essay he wrote for Newsweek in August 1978, he had stated that his hopes for the reform of American higher education had dwindled by then to the verge of despair because, even where the sciences had not displaced the humanities, the method of teaching the humanities was as specialized as in the sciences. In other words, ". . . the broadly educated generalist has become an endangered species," as a result of which we are threatened with, in the words of the title of the essay, "The Disappearance of Culture."

These "dismal considerations," Adler continued in his Newsweek essay, sent him to rereading Ortega's two books of 1930 entitled The Revolt of the Masses and The Mission of the University. "there I discovered--he said--a proposal for the reform of the university as radical as that proposed by Hutchins in 1936, but unknown to him at that time." Later in the same month that the essay appeared Adler delivered a lecture at the Aspen Institute of Humanistic Studies that spelled out in more detail the insights he had discovered in Ortega. He also shared with his audience the fact that he had finally found a clue to how it came to be that the institute founded by Walter Paepcke in Aspen in 1950 bore the words "for Humanistic Studies." Adler read a letter written by Ortega to Paepcke in October 1949, following Ortega's visit to the Goethe Festival in July of that year, urging Paepcke that there be established something similar to the Institute of Humanities that he had founded in Madrid.

In the Aspen lecture Adler adknowledged that the two books by Ortega "crystallized my own thinking about the crisis that confronts us"--the preservation of culture in our society. Ortega identifies humanistic learning with culture, an identification with which Adler says he agrees, adding only that humanistic learning might also be called the learning of the generalist in contradistinction to that of the specialist. The generalist, Adler continued in his Aspen lecture, is endangered because even the humanities are taught and studied currently as specializations. Our undergraduate colleges offer an indigestible smorgasbord of electives with a few core courses--all as specialized as courses in the professional and graduate schools where specialization is needed. As a result, undergraduate colleges are treated by the graduate and professional schools like bush league feeder stations for their major league baseball clubs--an observation concerning which Adler and Hutchins were in agreement as early as 1936. In the intervening years the elective system, Adler contends, has become even "more chaotic" and specialization has grown "more intense."

Obstacles to reform this situation, Adler acknowledges, now appear insuperable. It is no longer feasible: (1) to limit specialization to graduate and professional schools; (2) to appoint college teachers because they are generalists rather than specialists with a Ph.D to prove it, and without regard to a specific subject matter and department; (3) to emancipate undergraduate colleges from the influence of graduate schools; (4) to abolish the elective system with its major and minor; and (5) to convince parents not to send their young people, and young people

not to go, to college "mainly" to acquire those skills needed to earn a living, but "solely" to become cultured human beings. Regardless, none of these things are likely to happen for the time is overwhelmingly in the opposite direction--as explained, Adler points out, by Ortega in The Revolt of the Masses in a chapter whose title clearly indicates the problem: "The Barbarism of Specialization." For example, the scientist is acquainted only with one science and in that one science with only a small portion of it. The scientist declares this a virtue and labels a dilettante the person who has any curiosity for the general scheme of knowledge. As a result, we have professionals so narrowly trained that they are learned but uncultured, appropriately called "learned ignoramuses." Their stupidity of thought, judgement and action is evident, Ortega continues, all around us. The central mission of the university, its primary function, is not the training of professionals or the doing of research, but the acculturation of citizens. Culture as the vital system of ideas of a period is needed by all.[2]

Following this summary of Ortega's philosophy of education Adler "translated" Ortega's message into terms more appropriate to American institutions today. According to Adler, the primary function of undergraduate colleges is to teach "the ordinary student" to be a cultured person rather than waste time by specialized instruction and training that comes for some afterwards. To accomplish this the curriculum must be devoted "entirely" to the humanistic learning of the generalist. This includes, especially, the study of philosophy, but not as the specialized and technical discipline it has become. Rather,

philosophy as the consideration of the basic ideas that constitute the framework of culture must be restored. Those who teach in such a program should be appointed, Adler agrees with Ortega, for their talent in teaching rather than because they are research workers, who generally regard their teaching as time stolen away from investigation.

In the fall of 1978, the same year as the Newsweek essay and Aspen lecture, the Paideia Group was established. It corrected, Adler says, his mistake of trying to reform higher education first. Rather, it proposed a reforming of the twelve years of compulsory schooling common to all. Indeed, Ortega himself--Adler observes--had recommended a "high school" of the humanities be established at Aspen. The Paideia Group went beyond what Ortega had recommended and proposed that education for acculturation be in all twelve years of schooling. Some do not go to college and, what is more important, by that time it is too late in the lives of the young to try to cultivate their minds by a general, humanistic learning.

Of the six quotations from Ortega's Mission of the University Adler shared with his audience at the symposium at the Library of Congress, one in particular--he declared--is "the germ of the revolutionary idea" that is central to The Paideia Proposal. The quote concerns the need to offer a general, humanistic education to the working classes as well as to the professional classes who now mainly populate our institutions of higher learning. Based on this quote, The Paideia Proposal insists on a high quality, nonvocational and nonspecialized education for all twelve years. The course of study is to be the same with only one elective, the

required selection of a second language. In its chapter on higher education The Paideia Proposal follows Ortega's lead that such education have three objectives: the transmission of culture as the primary one, while the teaching of the professions and scientific research not be mandatory for all. To illustrate how The Paideia Proposal carries out Ortega's recommendation, Adler quoted from the concluding paragraphs of the chapter on higher learning. The statement most revealing of Ortega, as I heard Adler, was the following: "(But) we can and should do something to mitigate the barbarism of intense specialization, which threatens to be as destructive in its own way as the abandonment of specialization would be."[3]

Adler concluded by stating that there is only one important point in The Paideia Proposal for which he could not find a background in Ortega's writings on education, although he conceded it was probably there.[4] It is that educational institutions at their very best cannot succeed in educating human beings because youth is "an insuperable obstacle to becoming educated." As a result, education is a life-long process that reaches its fruition in the later, mature years of one's life. To become a truly educated person is something for which all formal schooling is a mere preparation. Indeed, in the words of The Paideia Proposal, "(but) learning never reaches a terminal point. As long as one remains alive and healthy, learning can go on--and should . . . ."[5]

As the respondent to Mortimer Adler, Jaime Benitez came to his recue and provided from untranslated writings evidence that Ortega did emphasize the unending process of learning by showing that life itself is

a permanent conflict in an unending drama involving a person, the person's circumstances and chance. Likewise Benitez introduced Ortega's thought on correlating the education of children and the future of grownups, as is seen in the early essay of 1921 entitled "Biology and Pedogogy" (biologia y pedagogia), and as late as 1953, two years before his death, in a letter to the Ford Foundation. In the former Ortega had cautioned against adjusting the child to the present environment and advocated the stimulation, instead, of the spiritual vitality of the child. In the latter, he reaffirmed his conviction that education is the preparation in the present for lives in the future.[6]

My contextual material is of an historical nature and places what Adler has said in its proper perspective. The two books on which Adler relied, namely, The Revolt of the Masses and the Mission of the University, are connected with the year 1930. The most famous of the two, indeed the best known work of Ortega, is The Revolt of the Masses. It consists of essays that first appeared in the leading Madrid newspaper El Sol, beginning in October 1929 and running through February 1930. The origin of the theme goes back to Ortega's work of 1921, entitled Invertebrate Spain, that contains among other essays one "on Fascism" that identified that movement with the mediocrity of the mass-man mentality. Mission of the University consists of an address Ortega delivered to the Federation of University Students at the University of Madrid in late fall of 1930.

The year 1929 was an important one for Ortega and for Spain. In January of that year Ortega returned from his second of what were to be

three trips to South America during his lifetime. He had left in August of the previous year for Argentina where he had many admirers, and for Chile where in December he had addressed its Parliament.[7] In March, General Primo de Rivera, who had taken control of the government in September 1923 with what some called the complicity of King Alfonso XIII, closed most of the Spanish universities, including the University of Madrid whose Chair of Metaphysics Ortega had occupied since 1910. "The politics of the military dictatorship was generally hostile to free intellectual activity, in which the government perceived a constant threat," although it did succeed in imposing a sort of order that prolonged the monarchy for another six and a half years.[8] Eventually Spain's other internationally known intellectual, Miguel de Unamuno (1864-1936), then Rector of the University of Salamanca, was removed from his position and later sent into exile in 1924 for anti-government activities. Even Ortega's brother, the engineer Eduardo Ortega y Gasset, found himself in exile.[9] At first Ortega, like many other intellectuals who were exasperated by the previous chaos, expressed considerable sympathy for the declared objectives of the new government, and avoided direct criticism by writing around the censorship restrictions imposed. By March 1928 his article on "Ideas politicos" was forbidden publication.

It must be stated that Ortega, much like the American philosopher John Dewey (1859-1952), led a rather unconventional life for an academician.[10] Born into a family that owned and operated the most prestigious daily newspaper of liberal tendencies in Spain, el Imparcial,

Ortega began a career in writing at least as early as 1902 when he was nineteen. After returning in 1908 from post doctoral studies in Germany, he founded the first of a series of journals, the most famous of which was to be the Revista de Occidente, founded in 1923, that introduced to the Spanish-reading world the latest in European thought long before the English-reading world knew of the same theories. An article in 1917 critical of the government led to his separation from the family newspaper, and his becoming the editorial spirit behind a new daily founded that year, El Sol, in which most of his works first appeared as articles before being collected and published as books. Given Ortega's avowed aim of raising the level of Spanish intellectual life to that of contemporary Europe, he had no choice but to meet the public through the general press. By his writings Ortega became the preeminent intellectual figure in Spain during the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera.

In protest to the closing of the universities, Ortega, like many others, resigned his post, and during the months of April and May delivered his class lectures on "What Is Philosophy?" to the public in rented theaters, the better to call attention to the government's actions.[11] It was in such historical circumstances that the essays that form The Revolt of the Masses began to appear. When he wrote that those of mediocre mentality, those who may be competent in one area and, so, mistakenly think themselves competent in all areas, had taken over the leadership positions, he had some definite individuals in minds, and his many readers knew who they were without his having to name names. By January 1930 Primo de Rivera resigned and left for Paris. Unamuno, who

had vowed to remain in exile until the dictator stepped down, returned in triumph from France. In November Ortega openly criticized the monarchy in El Sol, at approximately the same time he was delivering the lecture on the Mission of the University. The municipal elections of April 12, 1931 gave such a majority to Republican candidates that the King voluntarily left the country on April 14, and the Second Republic was proclaimed. Ortega's short-lived political activity during those years belongs to another account. Suffice to say that conditions grew steadily more chaotic and the Republic lasted until August 30, 1936 when the Civil War broke out as the result of an Army revolt. Fearing for his life, and ill from severe gall bladder problems, Ortega and his family took refuge in the university buildings before leaving for France, then Portugal and Argentina in 1939, returning to Portugal in 1942 where he resided until a brief visit to Spain in 1945 led to taking an apartment in Madrid in 1948, in which city he died on October 18, 1955.

It was in 1948 that Ortega, with Julian Marias, one of his closest disciples, founded the Institute of Humanities in Madrid that lasted for only two years.[12] Ortega had declined to reclaim his Chair of Metaphysics at the University of Madrid, and it remained vacant until he was duly "retired" in 1953. Ortega and the Franco government entered into a sort of truce: Ortega did not criticize the government and Franco looked the other way. The Institute was inaugurated with a series of lectures on Arnold Toynbee's theories, lectures later published under the title of an Interpretation of Universal History.[13] In 1949 Ortega journeyed to the United States for his first and only visit to the

country he had labeled in The Revolt of the Masses the paradise of mediocrity. The occasion was the International Bicentennial Convocation in honor of Goethe in Aspen, Colorado, at which he delivered two lectures in Spanish, with a running translation by his friend, the famous American playwright Thornton Wilder.[14] Other distinguished foreign speakers were Albert Schweitzer traveling from Africa and Ernst Curtius from Germany.

The Colorado event was an opportunity for Robert M. Hutchins, Chancellor of the University of Chicago and Chair of the Board of the Goethe Bicentennial Foundation, to meet and befriend Ortega. In 1945 Hutchins had enthusiastically reviewed the English translation of Mission of the University.[15] He found it "a shocking book," one which could be approved by no university president because it proposed nothing short of turning the entire university upside down in order to insure that it fulfill its destiny. What Hutchins had thought was an academic infection localized in the United States was seen, as a result of his discovery of Ortega, to be part of an international epidemic that threatened academic life everywhere. He concluded by saying that Ortega has shown us (university presidents) a vision toward which we should strive in order that institutions of higher learning might once more become the major "spiritual" power in society to guide human life.

Benitez, at that time President of the University of Puerto Rico, availed himself of the presence of Ortega in Colorado to journey there to meet him personally. There had long been admiration for Ortega on the part of Benitez. He had written his doctoral dissertation in 1939 at the

University of Chicago on Political and Philosophical Theories of Ortega y Gasset, the first of thirty-two dissertations to be completed on Ortega in the United States.[16] It had been Ortega who inspired in absentia "the winds of change" in the University of Puerto Rico in the early forties that took Benitez from the position of instructor in the social sciences to the presidency. At Aspen Ortega and Hutchins invited Benitez to join in their interchanges on the university, and for a week thereafter Benitez accompanied Ortega throughout the country on a visit, it is reported, that changed Ortega's views considerably about the United States.[17]

Given the above historical context of the appearance of The Revolt of the Masses and Mission of the University, as well as or Ortega's journey to Aspen and personal meeting with Adler's close friend, Robert M. Hutchins, I now turn by way of conclusion, to the adoption and adaptation of Ortega's views by Adler. I cannot refrain from observing that exasperation with educational conditions makes strange philosophical bedfellows. If one were to compare the metaphysics and anthropologies of Ortega and Adler, one would find what appears to be irreconcilable differences. Adler's adoption, as a young student at Columbia University, of the philosophy of Aristotelian-Scholasticism, as expressed especially in the philosophical realism of Thomas Aquinas, would have been considered anacronistic by Ortega, for Ortega maintained the times called for a going beyond both idealism and realism.[18] Even Adler's creative adaptation of Thomism would not have apparently impressed Ortega, who was accustomed to the rigid academic Scholasticism of Spanish

Catholic institutions of learning, and who himself was viciously attacked as unworthy to teach young people by those who called themselves Thomists, especially after the Franco victory regained for the Spanish Church its right to teach religion on all educational institutions at all levels that it had lost during the Republic, for whose existence Ortega was in part blamed.[19]

A comparison of Adler's Chapter 6, "Individual Differences," in The Paideia Proposal with what Ortega says about human nature and equality is, especially, revealing. For Adler, "despite their manifold individual differences, children are all the same in their human nature. They are human beings and their human equality consists in the fact that no child is more or less human than another."[20] For Ortega, "man . . . has no nature; what he has is . . . history." Furthermore, everything human is given in degrees, and the advocacy of equality in humans is one of the most dangerously stupid ideas in contemporary times.[21] This juxtaposition is not as startling as it initially appears, and this for two reasons. First, The Paideia Proposal is not a philosophical treatment even if it is a statement of Adler's philosophy of education. Of necessity it is presented in everyday language with a minimum of technical terminology so as to be readily intelligible to a maximum audience. Ortega's position is more philosophically stated. It in no way means to advocate what we in the United States have come to see as unequal treatment under the law of the land. Once compared in detail, the anthropologies of Adler and Ortega would be seen not to contradict but rather to complement each other, a comparison we must leave for another time.

Secondly, both philosophers are beginning with a concern for the same present state of affairs: the deplorable condition of education. Despite their different theories of person and reality, as long as each keeps in view the actual educational conditions, practical cooperation is possible to transform the conditions. This possibility of cooperation despite theoretical differences is rather hopeful. The area of educational reform offers one of the few occasions when differences of theory do not make a serious difference, that permits philosophers to work together rather than at cross purposes to illustrate the truth of Dewey's observation that education is philosophy in practice.

Among other areas in which we might compare Adler and Ortega, none is more basic than their calling for action on the part of the State in accomplishing their suggested reform of education.[22] Ortega's assertion is connected with his effort to extend the benefits of a university education to the working classes. At the time he made it (1930), this implied for Spain nothing short of a social revolution in which the middle and professional classes were being asked to share their economic and political gains from the upper classes with the working classes. Although under the Second Republic such did occur to some degree, the drastic swinging of the political pendulum during 1931-36 led to the four year bloody Spanish Civil War, and to the totalitarianism over <u>all</u> classes by a general who looked upon himself as the savior of Spain. Adler's suggestion is connected with his attempt to convince parents to send their children on to higher education, and young people to go beyond the twelve years of compulsory education, for the sake of

developing themselves humanly through the knowledge and experience they would obtain from schooling rather than for the sake of jobs. This implies, I contend, nothing less than a guaranteed annual wage for every adult. It also illustrates the truth of Dewey's observation that the best available means of ensuring the continuation of democracy is education.

Notes

[1]See: "Microfilm of Ortega y Gasset Is Presented to Libaray," Library of Congress Information Bulletin, 41 (July 11, 1982), 158-59; "Library of Congress: José Ortega y Gasset in Twentieth Century Thought," New York Times Book Review, July 25, 1982, 22; Edwin McDowell, "Ortega y Gasset in Washington" in "About books and Authors," New York Times Book Review, July 25, 1982, 22; "Library to Offer First of Symposia Marking Ortega y Gasset Centennial," Library of Congress Information Bulletin, 41 (July 30, 1982), 219; and Georgette M. Dorn, "Library Celebrates Ortega y Gasset Centennary," Library of Congress Information Bulletin, 41 (November 26, 1982), 390-92.

Among the other speakers were such leading Ortega scholars in the United States as: José Ferrater Mora (Bryn Mawr), Oliver W. Holmes (Wesleyan), Harold C. Raley (Houston), and Philip Silver (Columbia). Among foreign speakers were: Jaime Benitez (U. of Puerto Rico), Julian Marias (National University of Extension Education, Madrid), Ernesto Mayz Vallenilla (U. of Simon Bolivar, Caracas), Soledad Ortega de Valera (Ortega y Gasset Foundation, Madrid), and Eugenio Puciarelli (U. of Buenos Aires). For Julian Marias's summary of the symposium for the daily press, see: "Oretega en Washington," ABC, 10-10-82, p. 3 (Madrid); reprinted in La Nacion, 25, Octubre 1982, p. 7 (Buenos Aires).

There are plans to publish the papers in Spanish and English editions. The Spanish edition will appear in the Argentine journal Sur, but no plans have been concluded concerning the English edition. Other symposia in the U.S. during the centennial year of 1983 were held at: Cornell (March 4-5), Yale (April 23), State University of New York at Albany (April 27-29), City University of New York (May 5-6), University of New Mexico (November 4-6), and Hofstra University (November 10-12).

[2]See: Mortimer J. Adler, "The Disappearance of Culture," Newsweek (August 21, 1978), 15; and José Orgega y Gasset, "The Barbarism of Specialization," The Revolt of the Masses (N.Y.: W. W. Norton, 1957), 107-14. Originally published in English in 1932, the translator chose to remain anonymous because of the controversial nature of the book. See also: José Ortega y Gasset, Mission of the University (N.Y.: W. W. Norton, 1966). Originally published in 1944 by Princeton University Press, the translator was Howard Lee Nostrand. Ortega's definition of culture as the system of vital ideas of a period is repeated in variation throughout the book, for example, pages 38, 42, 72-74.

[3]Mortimer J. Adler, The Paideia Proposal, An Educational Manifesto (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1982), 72.

The acculturation advocated by Ortega as the primary end of education must not be considered a social conditioning. It involves a critical knowledge of the culture (or system of prevailing ideas). Note the following: "Man commonly lives intellectually on the credit of the society in which he lives, a credit that has never been questioned. Only occasionally, in regard to one point or another, does anyone take the trouble to go over the account, to submit the accepted idea to criticism

and reject it or readmit it, but this time because he himself rethought it and examined its foundation." José Ortega y Gasset, Man and People (N.Y.: W. W. Norton, 1957), 264.

This critical dimension of teaching is the difference between instructing and educating. Cf. Ortega, The Revolt of the Masses, 51. It is the difference between having ideas and having "genuine" ideas, of having ideas in one's head and having ideas as well as the faculty of ideation. Cf. Ibid., 71, 73. Our present educational system, according to Ortega, is creating primitives, those who live in a civilized world but do not see the principles on which it was built, principles that involve standards, reason, justice--all things that make life in common possible and minimize violence and force. Cf. Ibid., 82, 75-76, 98.

[4]There is needed an anthology of Ortega's writings on education (both in Spanish and in an English translation) because of the scattered nature of his work. Urban DeWinter of Cornell, who presented a paper at the Cornell Symposium on "Ortega: The Anatomy of Pedagogy," is preparing such a work. (The entire symposium will be published in Spanish translation in the October 1983 issue of Cuadernos de ALDEEU, Asociacion de Licenciados y Doctores Espanoles en Estadoes Unidos.)

The extent of these scattered writings is seen in three doctoral dissertations on Ortega: Robert Corrigan, The Pedagogical and Cultural Ideas of José Ortega y Gasset (Western Reserve University, 1959); Ivan Luis Barrientos, "Life," "Culture" and "Higher Education" in the Philosophy of José Ortega y Gasset (Michigan State University, 1965); and Robert McClintock, Ortega as Educator: An Essay in the History of Philosophy (Columbia University, 1968). Only McClintock's study has been published in book form: Man and His Circumstances: Ortega as Educator (N.Y.: Teachers College, 1971). In addition, there is a Master's thesis on the theme: M. Ramirez, A Critical Evaluation of José Ortega y Gasset's Philosophy of Education (Catholic University, 1956). For its abstract, see: Catholic Educational Review, 54 (November 1956), 552.

For works in English touching on Ortega's philosophy of education, see: Robert Corrigan, "José Orgega y Gasset: Master Teacher," Kentucky Foreign Language Quarterly, 10 (1963), 120-32; Martin Dworkin, "Ortega y Gasset: Praeceptor Hispania," Journal of Aesthetic Experience, 6 (1972), 42-48; Juan Lopez Morillas, "Universities and their Mission," Brown Alumni Monthly (February 1956), reprinted as Brown University Papers, no. 32 (Providence, R.I.: Brown University, 1956), 8 pp.; Robert McClintock, "Ortega, or the Stylist as Educator," Journal of Aesthetic Education, 3 (October 1969), 59-80; Harold C. Raley, "Ortega y Gasset and the University," Cimarron Review, 1 (September 1967), 53-59; and Edward Sarmiento, "Ortega and Education," Universities Quarterly, 6 (1952), 368-74.

[5]Adler, The Paideia Proposal, 10.

[6]José Ortega y Gasset, "Biologia y pedagogia," Obras Completas (Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1961), II, 275-314.

See: Corrigan, Chapter 2, "The Early Education of the Child" and Chapter 3, "Some Observations Concerning Youth," op. cit., 14-68, for an explanation of its key ideas. Also, see: Victor Ouimette, José Ortega y Gasset (Boston: G. K. Hall, 1982), 76-80. The book by Ouimette is part of the Twayne World Authors Series; it is an outstanding contribution that encorporates Ortega's various political writings into his intellectual biography.

[7]See: Anton Donoso, "The Influence of José Ortega y Gasset in latin America," Filosofia, "Anais do VIII Congresso Interamericano de Filosofia e V da Sociedada Interamericana de Filosofia" (Brasiilia, Outubre/Novembre de 1972) (Sao Paulo: Instituto Brasiliero de Filosofia, 1974), III, 43-49.

[8]Ouimette, op. cit., 87. The son of General Primo de Rivera was a student of Ortega. José Antonio founded the Falange. He was anxious to win the approbation of Spanish intellectuals, implying that the minorities Ortega advocated as rulers of any society was his elite group. "In 1934 he wrote a personal letter to Ortega y Gasset thinking that the philosopher must have been impressed by the intellectual tone of the Falange's appeal. Ortega had not been impressed." Stanley G. Payne, Falange, A History of Spanish Fascism (Stanford: Stanford University, 1961), 50. José Antonio was shot shortly after the Civil War began by the Republican Government. General Franco took over his party and used it for his totalitarian purposes. After the war José Antonio because the official party martyr, being buried in a place of honor in the cathedral hewed out of a mountain in the "Valley of the Fallen" outside of Madrid, the mausoleum for Spain's Civil War dead.

[9]On Unamuno's exile and return, see: Margaret T. Rudd, The Lone Heretic, Miguel de Unamuno (Austin: University of Texas, 1963), 223-76. A study of his thought from the perspective of a disciple of Ortega is given in Julian Marias, Miguel de Unamuno (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1966), and a more general study is seen in the Twayne World Authors Series volume by Martin Nozick, Miguel de Unamuno (N.Y.: Twayne Publishers, 1971). For Unamuno's relationship with Ortega, see: Nozick, 194-96.

According to Payne, "Unamuno was initially better disposed toward the Falange than Ortega, . . . and in March 1935, on the occasion of a meeting in Salamanca, he received José Antonio in his home. He soon changed his mind, however, and accused the party of contributing to the 'dementalization' of the young." Op. cit., 50.

Unamuno and Eduwardo Ortega y Gasset were close friends, unlike José whose general philosophical position and proposal for the future of Spain, despite his great admiration for the elder man, contradicted that of Unamuno. Shortly after the death of José in Spain in 1955, Eduardo, from his self-imposed exile in Venezuela, wrote an article in which he ended by saying: "I tried to string together some of the words (on a university education) of my brother, lending them the voice which still inspires me, to fulfill this fraternal and patriotic duty (of demanding a

university that is not a false label and professors who are not swindlers.) It is not at all an appeal to violence--that I could never do in his memory--but of a high appeal to save the present and the future of Spain so the Spaniards, intellectuals or not, may discontinue being something inferior and stray in the life of Europe and so that we occupy our true position in Spanish America, the widest dimension of our culture." See: "An Appeal to the University Students of Spain," Iberica, 5 (march 15, 1957), 7-9.

[10]There is a similarity between Ortega and Dewey beyond their roles as socially active philosophers in their respective societies. Their theories on the instrumental role of ideas in knowing and the need of a new liberalism in the reconstruction of society, as well as the person as coming to be, have been pointed out. See: McClintock, Man and His Circumstances: Ortega as Educator, 449-500, 533, 562-63; and José Antonio Torres, "Supuestos filosoficos de las reconstruccion social en Ortega y Gasset," La Torre, 15-16 (1956), 401-32. Torres had written his doctoral dissertation for the University of Chicago (1954) on Philosophic Reconstruction and Social Reform in John Dewey and José Ortega y Gasset. One of Ortega's former students, Luis Recansens Siches, observed similarities between the two but did not develop his observation in "La contribucion de John Dewey a la filosofia del derecho," Panorama del pensamiento juridico en el siglo xx (Mexico, D.F.: Editorial Porrua, 1963), II, 601. Similarities were also pointed out by Barrientos, op. cit., 229, 223, 241-42.

I have contrasted them in "Dewey and Ortega on the Nature of Society," a paper delivered at the International Congress of Philosophy (Montreal, August 19-24, 1983), and to be published in The Journal of Social Philosophy, 14, no. 4 (1983), as well as in "The Notion of Culture in Dewey and Ortega," delivered at the World Congress of Philosophy (Montreal, August 21-27, 1983).

[11]The first public hall, the Sala Rex, proved to be too small for the large crowd that came, so the series was moved to the Infanta Beatriz Theatre. The entire lecture series was published only posthumously under the same title. See: José Ortega y Gasset, What is Philosophy? (N.Y.: W. W. Norton, 1960). Translated by Mildred Adams.

[12]For details about the institute, see: Edith Helman, "On Humanizing Education: Orgega's Institute of Humanities, Madrid, 1948-50," Hispania, 34 (1951), 47-50. For Ortega's collaboration with Marias, see: Harold C. Raley, Part I, Chapter I, "Encounter with Ortega," Responsible Vision: The Philosophy of Julian Marias (Clear Creek, Indiana: American Hispanist, 1980), 15-28; and Anton Donoso, Julian Marias (Boston: G. K. Hall, 1982), 31-38. The latter is a volume in the Twayne World Authors Series.

An illustration of how Marias has developed Ortega's initial insights is seen, for example, when their respective speeches on the nature of the university are contrasted. Ortega's "Mission of the University" (1930) was delivered fifty years before Marias's "The New

Mission of the University"--the latter as the inaugural lecture of the new Chair of José Ortega y Gasset on Spanish Philosophy, the first official teaching post Marias has held in his native Spain because of his anti-Franquist political philosophy of liberalism. See: Anton Donoso, "Orgega y Marias: sobre la filosofia de las ensenanza superior (1930-1980)," Cuenta y razon, 11 (Mayo-Junio 1983), 101-09.

[13]See: José Ortega y Gasset, An Interpretation of Universal History (N.Y.: W. W. Norton, 1973). Translated by Mildred Adams.

[14]See: Austin Stevens, "New Life Pattern Is Seen for Europe," New York Times (July 3, 1949), 28. Ortega had given his first press conference ever on arriving in New York City, saying that "America has a magnificent vigor and strength which are the best qualities a nation can have," even though what the country needed most was "an apprenticeship in the art of concentration." Austin Stevens, "Philosopher Hails Our 'Adolescence'," New York Times (July 2, 1949), 8.

For Ortega's views on the United States previous to his visit, see: Anton Donoso, "Ortega on the United States: A View from the Outside," Philosophy Today, 21 (1977), 143-49. The study is followed by the English translation, by Anton Donoso and Marjorie Reas, of the only two essays Ortega managed to write of the series he projected on the subject of the United States: "The New United States," 150-53, first published in the newspaper La Nacion (Buenos Aires), March 22, 1931, and "On the United States," 153-61, first published in the newspaper Luz (Madrid), July 27/29, 1932.

[15]See: Robert M. Hutchins, Review of Mission of the University, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 239 (May 1945), 217-20.

[16]For a review of over fifty years of scholarship on Orgega in the United States, see my forthcoming "Ortega en los Estadoes Unidoes," Quinto centenario (October 1983) as part of an issue devoted to "Ortega y America" in the journal published by the Department of the History of America, University Complutense (Madrid). The bibliography of works on Ortega consists of approximately 400 items, falling into six groups: 1) reviews of books by or on Ortega (117); 2) essays or studies (131); 3) doctoral dissertations (32); 4) books, including translations (14), and their reviews (47); 5) notices in newspapers and news magazines (20); and 6) miscellaneous items; forwards to books by and on Ortega, annotations in dictionaries and encyclopedias, chapters in books and anthologies, and a film (71). To these may be added two more groups: publications containing significant passing references to Ortega (46) and a supplement of various publications in the English language published in countries other than the U.S. (51). The film on hunting, produced by the National Rifle Association for TV to counteract anti-hunting presentations, is based on Ortega's Meditations on Hunting (N.Y.: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1972). Excerpts from the English translation by Howard B. Wescott had appeared in Sports Illustrated (September 25, 1972), 88-98.

[17]Approximately one half of the total number of 82 reels in the collection of the Ortega archives in the Library of Congress are now fully open to researchers, available in the Manuscript Division. Among the reels not open is one that is said to contain "valuable insights of Spanish perceptions of U.S. culture, through the personal observations of Ortega y Gasset and his colleagues as they toured (in conjunction with the Internaional Goethe Bicentennial Celebration in 1949) or resided in the United States." "Microfilm of Ortega y Gasset Is Presented to the Library," Library of Congress Information Bulletin, 41 (July 11, 1982), 159.

[18]On Adler's Thomism, see: Mortimer J. Adler, Philosopher at Large: An Intellectual Autobiography (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1977). Adler has been called ". . . the most fascinating and perhaps the most influential figure of the American Thomist revival" by Mark Heath in his review of the book for The Thomist, 46 (April 1982), 325. He goes on to ask and answer the following question: "What brought the brilliant young Jewish-American philosopher and St. Thomas so fruitfully together? It will appear from the book that it had as much to do with the quality of the mind and way of learning of Mortimer Adler (qualities such as an analytic and logical mind given to the habit of cataloguing) as it did with St. Thomas's vision of the real." Ibid., 327.

On Ortega's position that philosophy must go beyond both idealism and realism, see: José Ortega y Gasset, Some Lessons in Metaphysics (N.Y.: W. W. Norton, 1969). Translated by Mildren Adams from lectures originally delivered during the academic year 1932-33.

[19]For Ortega's "secular" views on religion, see: Corrigan, op. cit., 268-71. As is to be expected, the entire issue of Ortega's repudiation of Catholicism, without advocating anti-clericalism of any kind, brought him criticism from all sides. Most of the writings on this state of affairs by Spaniards are exceedingly emotional in tone and ad hominen in argument. For a German's view, see: Franz Niedermayer, José Ortega y Gasset (N.Y.: Frederick Ungar, 1973), 88-118. Translated by Peter Tirner. Significantly, a number of Spanish clerics, including Jesuits, have been writing in recent years studies on Ortega in a scholarly, more balanced, manner.

[20]Adler, The Paideia Proposal, 42.

[21]On human life as history, see: José Ortega y Gasset, History as a System and Other Essays Toward a Philosophy of History (N.Y.: W. W. Norton, 1941), 217. Translated by Helen Weyl. Similar quotes are to be found in other essays in the collection, for example, in "Unity and Diversity of Europe," 62 (". . . The past is man's nature . . .") and "Man the Technician," 108 ("Human life transcends the reality of nature.") "When Orgega says that man is no thing, that he does not have a 'nature,' but has a history, he does not want to say that there is nothing fixed and universal in man, but that he does not have a nature in the sense that things have a nature. The being of man, he wrote, is at

one and the same time natural and extranatural, a kind of ontological centaur. . . . Man has a nature to the degree to which he is an animal, a superior vertebrate, gifted with a psychic, all of which is under the laws of physics, biology or psychology; but human life is not identical with these natural elements (human life); it is what we do with these things." Julian Marias, "La metafisica de Ortega," ABC (October 27, 1955), part of "Homenaje" (Homage) paid Ortega at the time of his death in this Madrid newspaper. Italics added and translation by this writer.

On human realities as given in degrees, see: Julian Marias, Metaphysical Anthropology, "The Empirical Structure of Human Life" (University Park: Pennsylvania State University, 1971), 204. I am granting Marias his contention that his position is a development of Ortega.

On human equality, see: Ortega, Man and People, 130-38, especially 131 where the following is found: ". . . this inwardness that we discover in the feminine body and which we shall call 'woman' presents itself to us from the outset as a form of humanity inferior to the masculine. . . . In a time like ours in which, though to a diminishing degree, we suffer under the tyrannical myth of 'equality,' a time in which we everywhere find the mania of believing that things are better when they are equal, the foregoing statement will irritate many people." An understatement! See: Maryellen MacGuigan, "Is Woman a Question?", International Philosophical Quarterly, 13 (1973), 485-508, in which the views of Ortega and Marias, as well as Karl Stern and F. J. Buytiendijk are considered; Paul Zancanaro, Human Life and the Sexuate Condition as Disjunctive (M.A. thesis, University of Windsoe, 1981), 70-89 in which Marias's position is examined in detail; and Judy B. McInnis, "Julian Marias's Defense of Traditional Woman," Los ensayistas, 14-15 (Marzo 1983), 145-52.

Even Dewey had written: "The doctrine of equality never meant what some of its critics supposed it to mean. It never asserted equality of natural gifts. It was a moral, a political and legal principle, not a psychological one. Thomas Jefferson believed as truly in a 'natural aristocracy' as did John Adams." John Dewey, Freedom and Culture (N.Y.: Capricorn Books, 1963), 63. The book was originally published in 1939. To this list of those who believed in a "natural aristocracy" we may add the name of Ortega. This is what he meant by saying in The Revolt of the Masses (20): ". . . I have never said that human society ought to be aristocratic, but a great deal more than that. What I have said, and still believe with ever-increasing conviction, is that human society (if it is to be effective) is always, whether it will or not, aristocratic by its very essence, to the extreme that it is a society in the measure that it is aristocratic, and ceases to be such when it ceases to be aristocratic. Of course I am speaking now of society and not of the State."

[22]Ortega, Mission of the University, 33; and Adler, The Paideia Proposal, 75.

Adler: Ideological Imperialist

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Let me suggest that Mr. Adler is an encyclopediator, or one that attempts to encompass knowledge in a systematic manner and inculcate the young with this systematization. His Paideia Proposal provides an orderly plan to correct the woes of education and the society at large. In eighty-five pages he has addressed curriculum, faculty roles, administration, teacher preparation and continuing learning. In eighty-five pages he outlines a manifesto for education that imposes a given set of knowledge upon the youth. While the learned world has struggled since the dawn of civilization with the systematization of knowledge, and since all cultures have sought to impose their knowledge upon the youth, the question becomes how can Adler be challenged on such a noble task? The difficulty with the Paideia Proposal is that it imposes a broad curriculum without the foresight of what the implications of that curriculum might mean. (On an aside, and to be addressed with another paper is the idea, that Adler does not have a well developed learning theory). To return to the implications the concept may be even construed as being ideologically imperialistic. The imperialism suggests an antiquated system (in this case, an ideology) applied to a new world culture.

An International Perspective

To examine Adler's "Manifesto," let us look at the role of education in a neo-colonial world, and the application of those findings to Paideia and current needs within U.S. education. The neo-colonialism of today is more than a mercantilism of the eighteenth century. While economics is still of major importance, there is a political ideology that transcends the international activity. A technological scientific ideology is being purchased by developing nations, however subtly it is laced with political views. The balance sheet total for these countries is improved economic conditions through technology, and that requires education. Many of these countries, if not all, have been struggling with an imposed colonial education, encultrating them to some imperialistic ideal. They have been shackled with antiquated thoughts that have slowed their development in entering a post-industrial world. Many developing countries find themselves emerging from their colonial pupa a century and a half behind. Their feudal period is still fairly recent history in many cases. In some cases there may even be a neo-feudalism. As these countries turn to world powers for help, education is the commodity they seek in order to break the colonial or feudal grip. That education which is being purchased, represents dominant world cultures as the education enculturates each of these respective cultures. The educational systems reflect the technology of a rapidly developing world, but also the values and systems inherent within the world powers.

Crauford Goodwin and Michael Nacht, in their recent book, Absence of Decision address the international market for education and condemn our

governmental and higher educational institutions for their lack of planning and policy in dealing with the influx of internationals in U.S. colleges and universities.[1] Internationals are flocking to the U.S. in droves. Some experts suggest that within a few years ten percent of our student bodies in higher education will be international. Many internationals bring with them their families which swell local public schools with multicultural students. Those student families bring a marked increase in population to the local community, adding greatly to a pluralistic society, but also seeking enrollment in our public schools.

Beyond the influx of international students is the external sale of education through consultantships, extension to overseas sites, and foreign visitation of the U.S. schools. Again the bottom line is economic development for the nations, in the same fashion that we are addressing our economic problems. Many of our U.S. economic woes are blamed on education and every segment of society is examining what is wrong with our educational systems. These other nations, likewise are looking for the latest educational developments to supplant their colonial educational systems and thus improve their economic lot. These nations have had a set curriculum instilling their young with a rigidity that was to insure imperial power. Those nations now seek a plurality of programs to allow more to gain an education and contribute. Many countries such as Malaysia are purposely seeking input from a variety of countries, from a variety of programs and curricula to insure maximum flexibility for their nation's growth. Malaysia even has restrictions on the number of students that can study at any one university.

As the trivium and quadrivium were found inadequate for our own colonial times (as the United States moved towards independdence and industrialization together), developing nations are shedding an imposed colonial education form. And as we shed and revised significantly our colonial educational system, should we now seek to reimpose a past oriented curriculum upon our young today? If a colonial shackle has inhibited third world countries in developing appropriate technologies, how much more will a return to an imperialist standard shackle the minds of the citizens of the United States.

Preparation for Change

There is a plethora of futuristic literature today. While planning for the future borders on the prophetic, we know that things are changing rapidly. We know what the world is seeking for solutions to economic development and we know what business, industry, government and labor are seeking from education. Problem solvers are sought on all fronts. People that can fathom the situation and suggest competent solutions are in demand. And that is what is required of education. Education that leads to problem solving is being purchased by foreign nations, and also is being purchased by U.S. citizens.

Adler's concern is, as mentioned before, noble. To argue with him may smack of being un-American, since his purpose is for all

> to earn a living in an intelligent and responsible fashion, to function as intelligent and responsible citizens, and to make both of these things serve the purpose of leading intelligent and responsible lives-to enjoy as full as possible all the goods that make a human life as good as it can be.[2]

The argument is not to oppose Adler's goal of an intelligent citizenry. The argument is with his methodology. Imposing a standard educational methodology produces a standard colonial mind not addressing the future hope, but lost in some past mystique. While I support the idea of a liberal education, even for all, there appears a great need for a flexible, liberal education. Sexism, prejudice and enthrocentricity are easily perpetuated in a fixed curriculum. Even scientific development is slowed when part of a prescribed curriculum. The science becomes a "cookbook" task promoting content, but neglecting the process. In pluralistic, post-industrial world, an imperialistic curriculum will not foster the growth and development sought and perhaps required.

Adler's Neocolonialism

For the following reasons, it is suggested that Adler's proposal is neo-colonial or ideologically imperialistic. First, Paideia forces on all the same curriculum, and a decidedly western curriculum at that. While Adler may argue for a pluralistic society, his curriculum is monistic and he does not define how any other than a monistic society will result.[3] His point is well taken when a democracy requires all to be educated, but it does not follow that the same education for all produces a free thinking mass.

Second, the proposal is past oriented as if there is a fear that a change or a future orientation may tear the past from its precious moorings. Society is changing too rapidly to dwell too long on the past. The Boeing 707 belongs to the past for a child in the elementary

school. Turbo props and the V-2 are ancient history. Even the serenity of the farm community is past for a child of the fast paced urban scene. Not only is technology changing, but the psycho-social norms have changed significantly for right or wrong, or better or worse. The child of the millenium will have a very different world view and education must be prepared to lead the child, not to impose upon the child an antiquated lock-step past. The past is important, but Adler dwells on it to the neglect of the present and future.

Third, it would seem that the Proposal could only be implemented through government imposition. Education, it has been felt in this country, is too important to be defined by a single body. While education has been molded in the courts and has received appropriations from the Congress, it has never been explicitly defined. Education has been allowed a similar degree of freedom as religion has. How else does Adler propose uniformity with Paideia unless by legislation; the same way colonies were legislated into uniformity?

Fourth, Paideia emphasized specific teaching styles. First is the didactic approach, "teaching by telling."[4] Second is the coaching approach. A coach drills the team so that it responds in unison out of habit. There cannot be two drummers. Where is the pluralism? The empires needed a unification, so that the colonies would respond in unison to threats against the motherland. The coach molds the team into a unified body to repel the offensive of competing teams. The Proposal attempts to unify education against some onslaught. That onslaught may be change or futurism. The question becomes, what uniformity will

develop within the drilling coach methodology? Examination of the Socratic or maietic approach as Adler describes, does not give the impression of developing ideas, or even developing questions.[5]

In the sequel, Paideia Problems and Possibilities Adler discusses some of the problems and questions that the Paideia Group received. The group (according to the Preface) had decided not to deal with specific questions until "a concerned public" showed evidence of interest.[6] The questions discussed are only those from persons supportive of Paideia since to do otherwise might result in public debate of a detailed systematic study (according to page 1). This Paideia activity is suggested as being that of educational philosophers (page 2-3), forming a curricular framework. From the sequel, however, I am not sure whether the educational philosopher part, according to Adler, is the suppression of public debate or the suppression of a systematic study. The hesitancy of the Paideia group to discuss systematically some of the basic issues of the proposal seems to model a teaching style concerned with unification in monistic thought - in short, an imperialistic ideology.

Finally, Paideia sounds good in so many respects--education for all, and intellectual education for a democracy. But likewise a colony is guaranteed a market place for its goods and protection with the royal armed forces. With the good comes an imposition--one must buy the mother country's goods, and one must adopt the mother country's ideology. With Paideia too, one must adopt a specific ideology. The question becomes then, what will the uniformity bring--an education system like France? Like the USSR? What sort of revolt may result from the systematization

imposed? Even the study of history may not eliminate the problems of an imposed encultration. Our past suggests, and the present purchasing of education by developing nations also suggests that in a multicultural world, a common curriculum will not be acceptable. Universal education with the plurality of curricula is what the world is seeking. Perhaps our own pluralistic culture would do well not to impose a rigidity, but rather a flexibility. Perhaps an encyclopediatoric approach is too imperial for the needs of our society as we approach the millenium.

ENDNOTES

[1]Crauford D. Goodwin, and Michael Nacht, Absence of Decision (New York: Institute of International Education, 1983)

[2]Mortimer J. Adler, The Paideia Proposal: An Educational Manifesto. (New York: MacMillan Publishing Co. 1982, p. 18)

[3]Ibid. p. 36

[4]Ibid. p. 27

[5]Ibid. pp. 30-31

[6]Mortimer J. Adler, Paideia Problems and Possibilities. (New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., 1983).

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Anti-Intellectualism and the Paideia Proposal

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From the origins of free public schooling to the abuses of the Progressive child-centered and life adjustment movements, American educational institutions have reflected an anti-intellectualism unique to American society, an anti-intellectualism that underlies the charges of many of those critics opposing the Paideia Proposal. In Paideia Problems and Possibilities, Mortimer Adler purposely avoids responding to those teachers, principals, educational administrators, and professors of education who take issue with the proposal. While I believe the proposal contains flaws, I favor it in principle and believe that to whatever degree it can be implemented, American education will improve. As a rational humanist, I regard humanity at its best to be humanity engaged in self-reflective thought. Therefore, I am very impatient with those critics who attack the proposal from an anti-intellectual stance. My specific purpose today is to expose much of the criticism of the Paideia Proposal as being rooted in American anti-intellectualism and to point out the flaw in such claims.

The basis for my charge is Richard Hofstadter's Pulitzer Prize winning study Anti-Intellectualism in American Life in which the author documents the thesis that American educational institutions share with other institutions a basic and pervasive distrust of the intellect. Hofstadter shows that a common strain binding together anti-intellectual

attitudes and ideas is a "resentment and suspicion of the life of the mind and of those considered to represent it; and a disposition to minimize the value of that life" (p.7).

Americans have always valued intelligence: the ability to grasp, manipulate, re-order and adjust. In fact, America's respect for intelligence is the foundation of progressivism, the only truly American philosophy. Conversely, Americans have always distrusted intellect: the disposition to examine, ponder, theorize, and criticize. For that reason, Americans have been quick to make a case for intelligence against intellect. This case against intellect is founded upon a set of fictional and wholly abstract antagonisms: intellect vs. feeling, intellect vs. character; intellect vs. democracy; and intellect vs. practicality. A brief sociological inquiry will demonstrate the point.

According to Bertran Morris in his book Philosophical Aspects of Culture, we differentiate societies by the way their institutions interact to form particular patterns and configurations. The priorities of a culture mark its cultural focus. The cultural focus, then, is that institution or set of institutions that give a people's activities direction and meaning. Part of America's cultural base is a distrust of the intellect. From our distaste for European aristocracy to our frontier reliance upon action at the expense of theory, anti-intellectualism has permeated America's institutions. From the emotionalism of the Great Awakening to the 100% mentality of the moral majority, America's religious institutions have reflected the idea that intellect is anti-feeling. From the popular novel's exaltation of the

superior morality of "Joe Average" to the film and television industry's portrayal of intellectuals as cold, calculating monsters or pathetic bumblers, America's institutions of popular culture have reflected the idea that intellect is anti-character. From the repudiation of the "gentleman class" of our founding fathers by Jacksonian populism to the present time when to be labelled intellectual is tantamount to political suicide, America's political institutions have reflected the idea that intellect is undemocratic. And America's economic institutions, America's most powerful, influential focal institutions, have been among the most anti-intellectual of all. Throughout history, America's business and economic institutions have encouraged only minimal levels of skill acquisition necessary to allow workers to function effectively on the labor front, reflecting the idea that intellect is impractical. The institutions of religion, popular culture, politics, and business determine what values are preserved and transmitted in American schools. There should be little wonder, then, that teachers, principals, administrators, and college professors who have progressed through the American educational system operate on the basis of those values. While the Paideia Proposal is enjoying support among a significant number of educators, some critics continue to attack the proposal for the wrong reasons. To these faulty criticisms I now turn my attention.

The Paideia Proposal, which advocates enlarged understanding of ideas and values as part of column three learning, is ironically criticized as neglecting the affective domain, thereby being anti-feeling. These critics argue that the same course of study for all,

with its exclusively cognitive emphasis in the prerequisite column one and column two learning, largely ignores the affective domain at the critical early stages, thereby producing one group of knowledgable, skilled students on the one hand and a group of disruptive drop-outs with low self-esteem on the other. According to these critics, students must first "feel good about themselves" before they can apply themselves successfully to cognitive mastery and skill development.

I contend that these critics are mistakenly accepting the intellect vs. feeling dichotomy. They error in believing that educationally engendered self-esteem must precede academic success rather than follow from it. In our attempt to produce empathetic students with high self-esteem, we nearly ruined an educational system and the individuals in it by failing to see that self-esteem is a function of achievement, and that achievement in schools begins with cognitive achievement and culminates in affective growth.

The Paideia Proposal, which advocates an understanding of the ideas underlying the documents of American democracy, is criticized as being detrimental to good character. These critics contend that while the proposal might well produce highly educated students, it will not necessarily produce good American citizens. America is a pluralistic nation. As such, the necessity of socializing American youth is a more difficult task than socializing youth in more homogeneous societies. Therefore, Americans have always rightfully demanded that the school, as a social institution, place socialization at the forefront of its concerns. Schools are agencies for perpetuating and passing on the

values of the cultural base, the dominant values of our focal institutions. Obviously any nation will function more smoothly if the populace shares a set of unquestioned assumptions, a common ideology. Consequently, some distrust the sort of critical thinking that questions and probes the meaning of American political ideology.

I contend that these critics are mistakenly adopting the intellect vs. character dichotomy. Such critics evidently have little faith in the ability of the American way of life to stand up under scrutiny. A critical understanding and constant evaluation of American political ideology strengthens rather than weakens American patriotism. When any democracy pursues a policy of training as opposed to education, it undercuts the very foundation necessary for a viable democracy, that of a populace able to competently weigh what is in its best interest. The Paideia Proposal would bring to American schools the prerequisite knowledge for citizens in an open society: the arts of reading, speaking, and listening, as well as the mechanical arts and scientific skills. It proposes to provide a common education for all so that all might to the best of their ability reflect upon the self-evident truths that we choose to proclaim.

The Paideia Proposal, which proposes the same quality education for all, is ironically accused of being anti-democratic. The criticism basically takes two forms. First is the charge that by limiting students to one course of study, we are supporting a structure uncongenial to democracy. The second criticism is that all students obviously cannot benefit from such a plan of study. Those who can will become our

undemocratic elite; those who cannot will become our laborers and cast-offs.

First, I contend that one task of the professional educator is to prescribe to the student the best that has been said and written in our culture. Any untrained, uneducated person can pass six hours in a classroom by permitting students to study and do whatever pleases them. Second, I contend that critics who fear the production of an undemocratic elite simply refuse to read the words of Dr. Adler. He has explained on many occasions his faith that the best education for the best is the best education for all. Such critics obviously believe that democracy began with Andrew Jackson rather than with the likes of Thomas Jefferson, the latter having advocated the production of a democratic elite based on ability, an elite that will eventually rise to the top regardless of the outraged cries of egalitarians who would defy nature and level society artificially through the most undemocratic of means. Those who claim that some students would obviously fail under the Paideia Proposal are evidently unaware that students are failing now under our present mediocre system. If we must have failure, let us fail with the goal being excellence!

The Paideia Proposal, which advocates liberal education for all as the best preparation for a constantly changing job market, is ironically criticized as being impractical. These critics charge that the purpose of American education is to provide every student with economic and social mobility, and to do so the schools should teach those skills and subjects that <u>directly</u> relate to that end.

I contend that these critics mistakenly accept the intellect vs. practicality dichotomy. American education has always had an unwise aversion to theory, preferring instead to focus upon methodology. We see the results of this putting the cart before the horse in the fact that our educators have no consistent philosophy upon which to base meaningful practice. Equally ridiculous is the view that given a changing job field, schools should frantically try to keep pace. In a world of change, adaptability is the most desirable commodity. Since many of the slots for which we can narrowly prepare students will disappear, the best preparation for the world of work is mastery of the liberal arts. Anything less is unwise and undemocratic. On this point, Mortimer Adler agrees in principle with John Dewey, who never regarded progressive education or any other kind of education to by synonymous with job training.

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INTELLECTUAL CAPACITIES AND THE LIBERAL ARTS

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(Talk to Midwest Philosophy of Education Society; University of Chicago; Chicago, Illinois; November 11, 1983)

Mortimer J. Adler's Paideia Proposal, the report of the National Commission on Excellence in Education, and other recent recommendations such as that of the Carnegie Commission, raise issues of intellectual capacity which they either do not address or address by raw assertion. I shall attempt to address these issues as time permits. Speakers have been warned that unutterable nightmares await those who exceed their time-limits. We'll need to dip into both philosophy and psychology to make the case.

While there are various definitions of intelligence, most of them agree that it is a capacity or power to learn, to know, to understand. (John Dewey was a notable exception, but even he came to terms with the notion of capacity in his own framework.) We might say of a thought or a segment of behavior that it is intelligent (adjective); we would be quite unlikely to say that it is intelligence (noun).

Therefore, we need to look at what a capacity is. It is always differentiated from achievement, for a good if Aristotelian reason: It belongs to the order of potentiality, an aptitude for doing or receiving something. Potency is contrasted, of course, to act, which in this sense may be somewhat simply defined as fullness of being. Intelligence represents active as opposed to passive potency. (This kind of potency

is not to be confused with the kind of power found in a storage battery, by reason of which it is called "potent.")

The character of intelligence as potentiality has a number of implications, one of which is that it cannot be measured directly. There is no way to measure a power, although we may be able to measure its manifestations. We can, I think, measure the manifestations of intelligence in that indirect and relative sense in which any sort of psychological measurement is possible. Another corollary of intelligence as potency is that, in kind and amount, every organism is innately limited in the amount of this power that it can possess and use. Possibilities such as brain transplants await in the wings. Let us say what can be accomplished by such extraordinary means when it has been accomplished.

A psychological treatment of the question would take more time than we have. Let's note in passing that there was evidence from the study of identical twins before and after Cyril Burt fudged some of his data--if, indeed, he did. The study of identical twins provides the only adequate experimental situation, because it holds heredity constant, whereas there is no way to hold environment constant. Generally, IQ tends to correlate with kinship. For now, we must leave it at that.

Comes now Mortimer Adler, speaking for 22 educators called the Paideia Group, and presents a series of proposals for "long-needed educational reform." [1] The proposal conceives of education as divided into three phases: acquisition of organized knowledge, development of intellectual skills, and enlarged understanding of ideas and values.

While this curricular division was probably not written in the stars, neither does it seem deficient. All children are to be exposed to the same curriculum. We are not to suppose that anybody cannot learn it. As an example, all students are to achieve competence in a second language. (Ah, how happy a day it would be if more of them accomplished this in a first one!) There are to be no electives except the choice of a second language.

I find much to admire in the proposal, being fundamentally sympathetic to the liberal arts tradition from which it borrows heavily. What I must take issue with is the idea that everybody can learn everything. Adler apparently had his own unease, for he makes this assertion several times and several times backs off from it. (He was speaking for a group, and let us not forget the definition of a camel as a horse designed by a committee.) To illustrate the confusion, Adler says that, "With the exception of a few suffering from irremediable brain damage, every child is educable up to his or her capacity."[2] Why except the brain-injured? If there is intellectual capacity, that is what everyone is educable "up to," brain-injured or not. Capacities, however, differ.

In the early Eisenhower era, I taught ninth-grade English for a couple of years. Unlike normal, well-adjusted English teachers, I cared about grammar and tried to teach it. It usually seemed (perhaps you have had similar experiences) that those who were destined ever to grasp a given concept would have it after a few examples, perhaps only one. This is why the same material was part of the curriculum for grade after

grade, an embarrassing fact that was softened somewhat by calling it a "spiral curriculum." Children can, of course, learn to rattle off definitions of parts of speech and the like, but to recognize cases is something else. Consider, for example, the preposition as a word that shows a relationship. What is a relationship? Once the students were persuaded that sex was not being talked about, they were puzzled as to what was being talked about. Why shouldn't they be? A relationship is the mode in which one thing stands to another. That concept is so abstract that Hegel did not need to put forth his usual amount of effort to render it completely unintelligible. Most people will probably go to their graves never having had more than a fuzzy notion of what a relationship is. It follows that they will never have more than a fuzzy notion of what a preposition is. Yet, prepositions are taught in the ninth grade and I know not how many grades before that.

On June 9, in Hopkins, Minnesota, I attended a forum on "A Nation at Risk," the report of the National Commission on Excellence in Education.[3] The forum was sponsored by the Secretary of Education. President Reagan was the chief speaker. Neither in the Commission's report nor in this all-day meeting, did one read or hear any suggestion that there may be some students who cannot learn some things. (What one did hear from most of the speakers, incidentally, was that things are pretty bad, except in their own schools.)

Examples could be multiplied. The late Vincent E. Smith, in The School Examined, laid out the sort of integrated curriculum that everybody talks about and scarcely anybody achieves.[4] There was just

one trouble: What would we do with students other than the two or three per cent who could master it?

Those students who are in a school or college geared to the liberal arts tradition and who can master the curriculum, should. Perhaps it's as well that time does not permit development of an elaborate defense of his thesis; for, its validity finally depends on such issues as whether knowledge is objective and whether there is any way to know what should be done. Suffice it to say, those who offer affirmative answers to these questions should repudiate the cafeteria approach to education, under which children are not taught the alphabet unless they vote for it. Intelligence is a perfection--the perfection, indeed, that makes us human. We are often told that man can think because he has language. It seems likelier that man has language because he can think. Thinking is, in current argot, "doing our thing," and that is as much defense as will be made for it now to this audience of persons who think for a living.

I am given more pause by the cases of those who give no sign of ability to master the liberal arts. If one person understands something better than does another person, can it be the same thing that they understand? It does seem that there can be a confused grasp of a point, which becomes more explicit sometimes. Yet, if what is in the minds of A and B regarding X differs, it does not appear that we can speak of A and B having the same understanding. In the practical order, the point is less to split semantic hairs on this issue than to decide whether it is better for Freddie or Sue, who at best will emerge from Logic 1 or Biology I with a confused understanding, to take the course and emerge

thus, or to take something more geared to their capacities. There are millions of people, including the present defendant, who walk around with a jumbled and foggy understanding of relativity in physics, such that they would constitute less menace to their fellows and be less deluded themselves, if they had never heard of the subject. One need but consider all the non-sequiturs that philosophers have built upon this questionably relevant basis, ending by denying the possibility of the very sort of knowledge that is necessary to make Einstein's relativity theory valid.

We have a way in this country of solving epistemological and pedagogical problems by passing laws. By making 12 years of schooling compulsory, we declare that everyone can profit from this much education. Sooner than re-examine the premise, we give diplomas to those who have been present most of the time and have committed no major felonies during school time. By mandating special programs for those with learning disabilities or other psychological handicaps, we declare them able to reap substantial benefits therefrom. A friend of mine who directs such a program told of a parent who complained, "My daughter has been in a program for the deaf for four years, and she still can't hear." We refuse to let mere facts intrude into this whole area. Social scientists tend to deny the existence of individual differences. Where that cannot be done, they try the next-best thing and insist that such differences are learned. Where even that cannot be done, they insist that the differences do not matter.

Our emotional investment in such questions is obvious. I have often wished that the Lord had chosen to give me, say, ten more I.Q. points. It is my impression that I should then have been able to solve such problems when, as it is, I can only think and rethink endlessly, always coming out where in I went.

> "Ah, love, could you and I with fate conspire
> To grasp this sorry scheme of things entire,
> Would we not shatter it to bits, and then
> Remold it, closer to the heart's desire?"

Yes, Omar, we would. Meantime, individual differences are there to be dealt with.

I shall leave this problem of what to do with those who cannot deal well with the liberal arts unsolved, content to have raised it. These people seem to do well enough. The University of Colorado studied students who had been thrown out on academic grounds over a prolonged period. A lot of them turned up in the state legislature. There is much humble work on earth to be done: running elevators, moving barrels about when highways are ostensibly being repaired, mowing lawns, writing domestic comedies for television, shaping foreign policy. Particulars need not be enumerated.

The last recommendation of The Paideia Proposal is, "Institute remedial instruction...for those who need it..."[5] If to need it is to be able to profit materially from it, where does that leave us? With that question, I take my leave.

Notes

[1]Mortimer J. Adler, The Paideia Proposal--an Educational Manifesto (New York: Macmillan Co., 1982), p. 3.

[2]Ibid., p. 7.

[3]David P. Gardner et al., A Nation at Risk: the Imperative for Educational Reform (Washington: U.S. Department of Education, 1983).

[4]Vincent E. Smith, The School Examined: Its Aim and Content (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1960).

[5]Adler, op. cit., p. 82.

Mortimer Adler and the Progressive Tradition

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Introduction

Mortimer Adler's The Paideia Proposal addresses one of the major problems in educational philosophy; namely, determining what kind of education is consistent with and warranted by a democratic society. While Adler offers one solution to this dilemma, the Progressive Movement led by John Dewey, forwarded a very different answer. This paper will isolate and explore several areas of disagreement between Adler and the Progressives. The contributions of two educational philosophers, William Heard Kilpatrick of Columbia University and Boyd Henry Bode of Ohio State University, will be examined. Their work represents well the Progressive tradition in educational philosophy and stands in interesting contrast to the work of Mortimer Adler and the Paideia Group.

Searching for a Definition of Democracy

The question of what kind of educational system is appropriate for a democratic society hinges in part on how one defines democracy. Adler uses the term to refer to a political system in which all citizens have the right to choose their leaders through the electoral process. For Adler, democracy, universal suffrage, and an educated electorate are inevitably and necessarily intertwined.[1] The future of democratic society, he believes, rests with an electorate who, with "trained

intelligence," will competently address the problems facing our nation. Further, Adler warns of the probable consequences of a poorly educated democratic society when he admonishes, "Those who are not schooled to enjoy the blessings of a good society can only despoil its institutions and corrupt themselves."[2]

Kilpatrick and Bode, in contrast, view democracy as a particular way of life, not primarily as a system of government. Bode, for example, defines democracy as "a social organization that aims to promote cooperation among its members and with other groups on the basis of mutual recognition of interests."[3] Further, Kilpatrick identifies democracy with "a quality of associated living based on active respect for human personality . . . ."[4] Kilpatrick and Bode both maintain that democracy is an ideal, one never completely attained. The evolution of society toward this ideal is a process of constant revision, reevaluation of old standards, and rejection of absolutes.

Education in a Democratic Society

For Adler, a democratic educational system must guarantee equality of educational opportunity; that is, the same quality and quantity of education for all its students. Such a system must provide the individual with the essential knowledge and basic skills necessary to carry out the three demands of adult life shared by all citizens: to become a self-educating, self-developing individual; to carry out the duties of democratic citizenship; and finally, to earn a living. The broad aim of education, according to Adler, is to "help human beings

become educated persons."[5] He writes, "Schooling is the preparatory stage; it forms the habit of learning and provides the means for continuing to learn after all schooling is completed."[6]

Kilpatrick and Bode believe the schools should meet far different requirements. Since democracy for them is a particular way of life, they argue that the task of schooling is to promote that way of life through the cultivation of democratic character. Among the qualities possessed by this character, Kilpatrick maintains, are self-directiveness, sensitivity to the needs of others, and a disposition to act on an informed intelligence.[7] Time and time again, Kilpatrick implores teachers to seek growth of this character, leading to "ever better acting on thinking: ever better thinking to tell how to act, what to do: ever closer study of the results of the acting so as to test and correct and improve the thinking."[8] He argues that this character is best cultivated in schools which are themselves democratic, for "The kind of civilization we at bottom wish, that kind must our children live, live at home, live at school, live all their conscious life."[19] The schools must be a place where democratic values are experienced and practiced by teachers and students alike; that is, a microcosm of society itself.

Formulating a Curriculum

Adler's curriculum is designed to meet three specific instructional objectives, each corresponding to a way the intellect can be developed, and each accomplished through a different style of teaching and learning. These objectives and corresponding instructional methods are:

the acquisition of organized knowledge through didactics; the development of competency in basic skills through "coaching;" and finally, the growth of understanding through Socratic discussion of major works of literature and art.[10] Adler stresses the importance of integrating the three ways of teaching and learning throughout the twelve years of schooling. This program relies heavily on traditional subject matter areas for meeting all three objectives. Adler believes these disciplines "provide the learner with indispensable knowledge about nature and culture, the world in which we live, our social institutions, and ourselves."[11] To insure that each student receives this fundamental education, Adler calls for the elimination of all tracking and elective courses, leaving only a foreign language choice open to the student.

In contrast to Adler, the Progressive curriculum is designed to instill democratic values into the classroom as far as possible and incorporate a new theory of learning derived from the work of Charles Darwin. Kilpatrick and Bode do not specify a particular course of study. A static program is inconsistent with a view of life and the curriculum as dynamic.[12] The exposition of this curriculum is made even more difficult because Kilpatrick and Bode often disagree, though more in emphasis than in substance. Bode, a Pragmatist, is less concerned with the particular form of the curriculum as he is with attempting to transform the school into an environment for learning.[13] This curriculum clearly is an attempt to join democratic values with a new theory of learning.

Specifically, this new learning theory states that growth is a product of the child's experience in the environment. Kilpatrick believes learning occurs as responses prove unsatisfactory for fulfilling or attaining goals. New approaches, the products of thinking, must then be tried and retried until the purpose is achieved.[14] Bode, in a similar vein, suggests that learning consists of attaching "meanings" to our environment and that conduct hinges on these meanings. He writes:

> This dependence of conduct on "meaning" is familiar enough. To burn one's fingers, to get scratched by the cat, or to quench one's thirst at the drinking fountain, is to discover new meanings, which are then used for the guidance of conduct. Aims spring from the soil of experience, and new aims constantly arise as experience develops. Experience consequently has a marvelous flexibility and capacity for growth.[15]

Designed to harness this capacity, the Progressive curriculum largely consists of a succession of worthwhile experiences, or "projects." A project is a "whole-hearted purposeful activity:" the student must desire the purpose of the experience. For projects to be the best preparation for life, Kilpatrick argues, they should be as life-like as possible. Indeed, he conceived of the curriculum "as a process of living."[16] It is important to note that while Kilpatrick believes that the curriculum could be built around the project method exclusively, Bode doubts that this method afforded the continuity desire.[17] With the help of the teacher, student interests are transformed into purposeful activities. The teacher guides the selection of projects to insure that each experience will lead to growth in the direction of democratic character. Kilpatrick argues that when a child desires to learn something to meet a larger purpose, not only are the

facts or skills learned to a greater degree, but positive attitudes toward learning also result.[18] This method also builds desirable traits, he claims, by allowing students to practice, for example, self-direction and "acting on thinking."[19]

The project method does not ignore or discard traditional subject matter: to the contrary, this subject matter is crucial. Instead of determining or dominating the curriculum, however, traditional subject matter enters as a tool for achieving purposes. Kilpatrick explains,

> Such a curriculum of present good living will use matters customarily found in the school curriculum; but these will enter into the modern curriculum not as an authoritarian mistress to rule over all the rest, but as a minister and a servant to take subordination, subordination to the experience otherwise in progress.[20]

There remains the question of what knowledge the progressives regard as essential. Bode, in agreement with Dewey, asserts that the "essentials" are those elements which relate to experiences common to the broadest groups in society. These essentials, he argued, provide the knowledge required for full participation in community life.[21] The idea is that the determination of "essential" knowledge is more an empirical matter, the findings of which may change over time and place.

Finally, a word on vocational education. Kilpatrick maintains that students receiving vocational education in secondary schools should spend only a fraction of the day receiving that training, the majority of the school day to be devoted to a common core curriculum.[22] Bode specifies that to be democratic, vocational education can not limit the potential of the individual nor isolate individuals from the social life of the community. Bode points out the dangers of a narrow vocational training

when he warns, "A training that does not provide for growth becomes a means for promoting a caste system, in which the thinking is done by a few, while the rest are not supposed to be in need of a broad understanding."[23]

In comparing these two curricula, it is clear that Kilpatrick and Bode would object to Adler's program on many grounds, starting with the assertion that schools should be made consistent with political democracy, rather than social democracy. For Kilpatrick and Bode, democracy is more than a particular relationship between political leaders and citizens or a distribution of political power, although that is undoubtedly a part of it. Instead, the essence of democracy is found in the way that each member of society regards every other member, specifically, with profound respect for the personalities and rights of fellow human beings. This fundamental disagreement implies the very wide divergences between these two theories.

While Adler aims primarily at the intellectual development of the child, Kilpatrick and Bode seek character growth, stressing the whole child. Adler has very little to say concerning the promotion of social interest or any of the other values which comprise democratic character. Further, while Adler argues that learning results from didactics, or "teaching by telling," Kilpatrick and Bode would maintain that this learning would be very mild indeed. Adler's unusual interpretation of Dewey's "learning by doing" doctrine takes Dewey to mean that the most important kind of doing is intellectual doing. Kilpatrick and Bode interpret this doctrine much more broadly. In fact, the rationale behind

their program seems to be that learning by doing is the best way to learn anything. Therefore, to foster democratic behavior, the schools must give children practice in behaving democratically and must be democratic themselves. To be able to solve problems through the use of intelligence requires practice in solving problems with "ever greater acting on thinking," the very aim of the project method.

A Synthesis

Several pieces of literature highly critical of vocational education have emerged recently which indicate that vocational tracking is indeed creating a caste system, as Bode warned over 60 years ago. Grubb and Lazerson, for example, point out that not only is most vocational training terminal, the types of jobs for which training is provided are also dead ends.[24] Vocational education of this kind is inconsistent with the Progressive's program and one of the problems The Paideia Proposal commendably attempts to redress.

A one-track system, if adopted, would reduce the cast-like characteristics of the school. Of course, the curriculum issue would remain. Accepting the progressive definition of democracy, Kilpatrick and Bode argue persuasively that the schools should aim for more than intellectual development, much more than scholarship. To the extent that we "learn what we live," not just what we study, it becomes important for schools to seek a very high quality of living for all its students. A truly democratic school system would contain only one track, providing all students with practice and experience in democratic living--the best preparation for life in a democratic society.

Notes

[1]Mortimer J. Adler, The Paideia Proposal (New York: Macmillan, 1982), p. 3.

[2]Ibid., p. 79.

[3]Boyd H. Bode, Modern Educational Theories (New York: Macmillan, 1930), p. 14.

[4]William Heard Kilpatrick, Philosophy of Education (New York: Macmillan, 1951), p. 126.

[5]Adler, The Paideia Proposal, p. 10.

[6]Ibid.

[7]Kilpatrick, Philosophy of Education, pp. 295-296.

[8]Kilpatrick Remaking the Curriculum (New York: newson, 1936), p. 115.

[9]Kilpatrick, Philosophy of Education, p. 221.

[10]Adler, The Paideia Proposal, p. 22.

[11]Ibid., p. 24.

[12]Kilpatrick, Remaking the Curriculum, p. 109.

[13]J. J. Chambliss, Boyd H. Bode's Philosophy of Education (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1963), p. 92.

[14]Kilpatrick, Remaking the Curriculum, p. 22.

[15]Boyd H. Bode, Fundamentals of Education (New York: Macmillan, 1924), pp. 5-6.

[16]Kilpatrick, Remaking the Curriculum, p. 46.

[17]Bode, Modern Educational Theories, pp. 150-151.

[18]Kilpatrick, Philosophy of Education, pp. 254-259.

[19]Kilpatrick, Philosophy of Education, p. 297.

[20]Kilpatrick, Modern Education: Its Proper Work (New York: Hinds, Hayden & Eldredge, 1949), pp. 20-21.

[21]Bode, Fundamentals of Education, p. 31.

[22]Kilpatrick, Philosophy of Education, pp. 326-327.

[23]Bode, Fundamentals of Education, p. 34.

[24]W. Norton Grubb and Marvin Lazerson, "Rally 'Round the Workplace: Continuities and Fallacies in Career Education," Harvard Educational Review 45, No. 4 (November 1975), p. 470.

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Student Choices and a Standardized Curriculum Reconsidered[1]

by

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> No one would dispute the fact that it is a lawgiver's prime duty to arrange for the education of the young...since there is but one aim for the entire city, it follows that education must be one and the same for all...[2]

> I suffer whenever I see that common sight of a parent or senior imposing his opinion and way of thinking and being on a young soul to which they are totally unfit. Cannot we let people be themselves, and enjoy life in their own way? You are trying to make that man another you. One's enough.[3]

I. Preliminary Remarks on Debates About Educational Issues

Before commenting in Mortimer Adler's recently published book The Paideia Proposal, I would first like to say a few words about an essay Adler wrote over forty years ago.

In March of 1941 Adler had a debate with Bertrand Russell; when Adler was only thirty-eight years old and Russell was nearly seventy years old these two men met in a hall at Northwestern University to discuss the question, "Are there absolute and universal principles on which education should be founded?"[4] During their confrontation Adler argued the affirmative side and Russell took up the negative side. Moreover, in commenting on the way Russell conducted himself at the debate Adler reports that he was

> disappointed and shocked...by Lord Russell's performance, disappointed because his early writings--mostly before 1910 - led me to regard him as a philosopher, and shocked to find that a man whom most people still suppose to be a great philosopher, should be

> willing to make such a fool of himself in public...I did not win that debate, but Lord Russell certainly lost it in the estimation of every critical member of that audience, whose intelligence he insulted by clowning on the platform instead of taking the whole matter seriously enough to try to argue.[5]

In a long life which spanned nearly a century Russell became somewhat notorious for making a spectacle of himself in public. As it turns out, Russell's extremely unpopular ideas on such issues as war, sex, marriage, work, and education often lead people to think that he was a bit mad. And Norbert Weiner's claim that "it is impossible to describe Bertrand Russell except by saying that he looks like the Mad Hatter" in Alice's Adventures in Wonderland has unfortunately become a somewhat normal way of remembering Russell.

The popular image of Russell as the Mad Hatter of twentieth century philosophers has done much to discredit some of his extremely unpopular, novel, and highly interesting ideas. Nevertheless, Russell did produce some outstanding essays which explain in detail the skeptical philosophical position he so poorly argued for in public settings such as the one with Adler at Northwestern University. And in a number of ways Russell was a twentieth century skeptic who followed in the tradition of ancient Greek philosophers such as Protagoras and Socrates; these men helped to develop the idea that human beings could not know that they were in possession of absolutely true ideas. And in the last twenty-five centuries skeptics have produced some very complex arguments about the human inability to know the truth; for a good introduction to the topsy-turvy world of skepticism we need only recall that in the fifth century B.C. Protagoras decided to begin his book on theology by claiming that

> In regard to the gods I cannot know that they exist, nor that they do not exist; for many things hinder such knowledge, - the obscurity of the matter, and the shortness of human life.[6]

II. Overview of the Argument

I have begun my discussion of Adler's Paideia Proposal with comments about Russell and skepticism partly because I wish to note that in many ways the case Russell wished to argue for in his debate with Adler is one in which I have great sympathy. And given my skeptical leanings this paper will not attempt to provide definitive solutions to complex educational problems. Rather than have such grandiose aims, my hope here is to do at least the following; 1) demonstrate that there is a need to doubt the truthfulness of some of the claims made in Adler's Paideia Proposal; 2) suggest that Adler's solutions to some educational problems need to be challenged by more skeptical solutions; 3) argue that the questions which Adler has answered need to be replaced with other kinds of questions.

Unlike Russell who took on the awesome task of arguing the skeptic's case in general, I have decided to be specific in my attempt to create some doubt about how an educational program should be organized. In particular, this essay will center in on what I view as one of the most inadequate and doubtful aspects of Adler's Paideia Proposal; the aspect of Adler's work which will be challenged here is one of the points in his concluding section called "To School Boards and School Administrators." The single sentence from Adler's summary statement which will be the focus of attention here appears as point six and it reads as follows:

> Eliminate all electives from the course of study except the choice of a second language to be studied.[7]

And Adler's views on the need to eliminate electives are discussed in Chapter Four of his book where he makes it quite clear that in elementary and secondary schools electives and specialization "are wholly inappropriate."[8] For Adler, the

> course of study to be followed in the twelve years of basic schooling should...be completely required, with one exception.[9]

Is it reasonable to rely on educational experts to create a standardized curriculum which only gives students the opportunity to make a single curricular choice in the first twelve years of schooling? This question, which I will refer to as Adler's curriculum problem, is the central concern of this essay.

Adler would of course offer an affirmative answer to the curriculum problem I have named in his honor; the required course of study or standardized curriculum that Adler envisions for children from the ages of six to eighteen is a crucial part of the "one-track system"[10] of public schooling that is argued for in the Paideia Proposal. However, unlike Adler, I have decided that his curriculum problem is best solved with a negative answer; for the remainder of this paper I would like to offer a brief explanation about why I disagree with Adler's views associated with curriculum development.

Briefly put, my aim here is to demonstrate that Alder's recent attempt to solve educational problems provides one way to open up a dialogue that has existed since Socrates argued with the sophists about whether or not teachers are wise enough to determine what students should learn.

III. Plato and Aristotle on Educational Authorities

In many ways it is correct to say that Adler's Paideia Proposal endorses ideas which have been a significant part of Western thought since the time Plato wrote his monumental book the Republic. In this classical work from antiquity Plato argues that the education of young children should not be left to chance; for Plato, it is both necessary and desirable for a society to identify some educational experts who "supervise the making of fables and legends, rejecting all which are unsatisfactory."[11] Moreover, although Plato's famous student Aristotle often criticized and disagreed with his master,[12] when it came to educational matters there would be a great deal of agreement between these two ancient philosophers; for Aristotle, the learning of children should be controlled and determined by "officials known as inspectors of children's welfare."[13]

An understanding of Adler's recent educational proposals can be greatly aided by some familiarity with Aristotle's work. In many ways Adler is a twentieth century disciple of Aristotle; in works such as Aristotle for Everybody and The Conditions of Philosophy,[14] Adler makes it quite clear that "there is no better teacher than Aristotle"[15] if one wishes to understand how to solve philosophical problems. In addition, although many of Aristotle's ideas have been superseded by scientific theories, it is still the case that some of Aristotle's views have yet to be replaced with more uncommon and perhaps better ideas. Specifically, the common sensical educational philosophy endorsed by both Plato and Aristotle incorporates an idea such as the following:

Teachers, school administrators, and other socially certified educational experts are reliable authorities who should determine and control what students learn and do in school. For convenience we can refer to this statement as the policy of expert authority; an educational program which endorses this policy can be referred to as a common sensical or conventional school.[16]

IV. Alder as a Modern Advocate of the Policy of Expert Authority

Adler's Paideia Proposal is one of the most recent educational works which endorses the Platonic and Aristotelian notion that it is reasonable for a society to identify some individuals as reliable educational experts who should control learning in a school. Whereas Plato, Aristotle, and Adler have not explicitly argued for the policy of expert authority, it can be claimed that these three men, and numerous others over the last twenty-five centuries, have tacitly assumed that a notion such as the policy of expert authority is something like a universal and absolute idea which should guide educational practices. Yet, despite the fact that there has been a wide acceptance of policy of expert authority, there has been much debate about how this policy should be interpreted.

Platonic and Aristotelian educational theorists have spent much time arguing about the specific groups of people which should be viewed as reliable educational authorities; at times such groups as the priests, the nobility, the capitalists, the leaders of the proletariat, or the democratically elected school board members, have been considered tne one best able to determine the education of the young. However, what needs to be noted here is that Alder views teachers as the "first among

equals"[17] and his entire educational perspective assumes that a policy such as the one on expert authority is true. Thus, Adler appears to have no doubts about the notion that educational experts are indeed reliable authorities who know "the shape of the best education for the best;"[18] following Robert Maynard Hutchins it is Adler's claim that, "The best education for the best is the best education for all."[19]

V. The Emergence of s Liberal Critique of Educational Authorities in the Works of Socrates and Russell

Reasons for rejecting the policy of expert authority have been available to Western educational theorists since the time that Socrates criticized the sophists for claiming too much for the knowledge they wished to teach to their students. It will be remembered that in Plato's Apology Socrates is credited with making the highly uncommon sensical discovery that wise people are wise partly because they realize that their "wisdom is worth little or nothing...at all."[20]

During his lifetime Socrates argued against the notion of viewing the teachers of his day as reliable educational authorities who possessed wisdom and truths which could readily be taught to the young; the sophists who were the intellectual enemies of Socrates did indeed claim to be wise men who knew valuable information which the young should learn. On the other hand, Socrates rejected the common sensical notion of viewing teachers as individuals who possessed valuable knowledge because in his conversations with those who were considered to be wise Socrates had discovered that "the men whose reputation for wisdom stood highest were nearly the most lacking in it."[21]

The Socratic views on educational authorities have not been totally ignored by those who have grappled with educational problems. Specifically, Russell made a number of efforts to argue against creating educational programs which identify certain groups as reliable educational authorities and in his essay "Freedom Versus Authority in Education" the following is claimed:

> Authority, if it is to govern education, must rest upon... the State, the Church, the Schoolmaster and the parent...no one of them can be trusted to care adequately from the child's welfare, since each wishes the child to minister to some end which has nothing to do with its own well being.[22]

Unlike Aristotle who thought that a society should appoint "inspectors of children's welfare," Russell seems to suggest that even good intentioned social authorities may unknowingly act in ways which are not consistent with a child's welfare. Thus, as did Socrates before him, Russell saw a need to limit the manner in which social authorities controlled learning in an educational program.

Following in the liberal political tradition of people such as John Locke, Thomas Jefferson, John Stuart Mill, and many others, Russell argued that the power of educational authorities needed to be checked for the same reasons that it was necessary to check the power of kings, church leaders, and the majority in a democracy; for Russell, the need for

> freedom in education...is ideologically connected with liberalism, and has the same degree of truth and falsehood that belongs to the conception of liberty in other spheres.[23]

VI. Summerhill and the Development of the Policy of Personal Responsibility

The liberal educational philosophy that has its historical roots in the work of Socrates had other advocates in this century besides Russell. In particular, much credit should be given to A.S. Neill for what he did to understand how the ideas of Socrates are indeed relevant for modern schooling.

Although the Beacon Hill School founded by Russell in the 1920's incorporated aspects of a Socratic educational philosophy, it appears that Neill's school Summerhill has done the most in this century to prove that it is possible to have learning situations which rely on Socratic ideas such as the following: All school members, students included, should be viewed as fallible authorities who are personally responsible for deciding their own school activities and many of the policies that govern a school. This statement can be referred to as the policy of personal responsibility; an educational program which endorses this policy can be referred to as a self-governing school.[24]

Since the early 1920's Neill's school Summerhill has helped to demonstrate that under certain circumstances an educational program can indeed promote worthwhile learning if the policy of personal responsibility is used in a school with students from the ages five to sixteen.[25] And what needs to be pointed out here is that Socratic educational theorists such as Neill have argued for the creation schools which are significantly different from the ones described in Adler's Paideia Proposal. Specifically, in schools such as Summerhill "lessons are optional."[26] Thus, unlike Adler who would eliminate almost all

electives from the course of study for elementary and secondary students, Neill has suggested that student choices should be the basis for a school curriculum during the early years of formal education; at Summerhill students are allowed to learn whatever they wish as long as one avoids illegal behaviors and dangerous activities that might be physically harmful to any school member.[27]

To be sure, it will be an extremely difficult task to help individual students create a curriculum, but to standardize learning may lead to a situation where schools unintentionally impede human growth and development. In regard to how standardization in learning can be viewed as dangerous it is worthwhile to note that Albert Einstein once said:

> a community of standardized individuals without personal originality and personal aims would be a poor community without possibilities for development. On the contrary, the aim must be the training of independently acting and thinking individuals...Give into the power of the teacher the fewest possible coercive measures so that the only source of the pupil's respect for the teacher is the human and intellectual qualities of the latter.[28]

Is it reasonable to have educational programs which allow for curriculum designs that are primarily determined by student choices? This question, which we can refer to as the Socratic curriculum problem, is far different from Adler's curriculum problem (i.e. Is it reasonable to rely on educational experts to create a standardized curriculum which only gives students the opportunity to make a single curricular choice in the first twelve years of schooling?).

Those who have fallen under the spell of Socrates as he is described in Plato's Apology may eventually decide that it is reasonable to argue the case that public school systems should create a few experimental

self-governing schools for people who wish to attend these kinds of educational programs. Furthermore, the recommendation to create experimental self-governing public schools would require a multi-track system that is significantly different from the "one-track" system of public education envisioned by Adler;[29] in a multi-track system the notion of equal educational opportunity would change from the idea that all individuals should have the same education to the idea that all individuals should have an equal chance to choose any educational program from the list of approved alternatives[30]

VII. A Concluding Remark

When I think about how people have responded to Platonic educational programs I am often reminded of a scene created by Mark Twain near the end of The Adventures of Tom Sawyer; it will be remembered that at the conclusion of this book Huck Finn, a motherless child whose father is a vagabond, has found a great deal of money during one of his escapades with Tom. And given his new found wealth a judge decided in his infinite wisdom that Huck can now become a respectable member of society by living under the protection of the widow Douglas. But Huck had a difficult time adjusting to the ways of civilization and he tells his good friend Tom the following:

> I've tried it, and it don't work; it don't work, Tom. It ain't for me; I ain't used to it. The widder's good to me, and friendly; but I can't stand them ways...The widder eats by a bell; she gits up by a bell - everything's so awful reg'lar a body can't stand it...And besides, that schools going to open, and I'd 'a' had to go to it - well, I wouldn't stand that, Tom![31]

Today we live in an age where the technology created by human beings has the potential to be far more oppressive than the bells which rang for

Huck Finn. Of course, our new technology is not our major problem; our troubles lie with our inability to imagine new ideas which will allow us to use our technology in intelligent ways. As it turns out, the computer which we often use as a tool for human oppression could be used for human liberation. And our reluctance to imagine how modern machines can be used to free individuals from unpleasant chores has allowed machines to oppress and dominate people in ways unimagined in previous centuries; the computer whose program relentlessly asks students to spell word after word has the potential to become a far greater taskmaster than tbe bell which tried ever so hard to make Huck conform to ways of life that were indeed inappropriate for him.

Huck would have greatly benefited from a school which would "let people be themselves, and enjoy life in their own way."[32] Unfortunately, the dream of such a Socratic school was beyond Huck's imagination. And this young rebel who lived in a pre-civil war slave state often chose to avoid the sound of the bell by making a wood shed or a raft on the Mississippi river his classroom. But children in modern communities are often deprived of the choices Huck had the courage to make; youngsters growing up in our contemporary cities and suburban areas may find that they have no place to run to when they are compelled to attend schools which have been created by lawgivers who consider it their "prime duty to arrange for the education of the young,"[33] Regrettably, the compulsory public educational programs which we now provide for children may at times be totally inappropriate for a number of individuals who are compelled by law to attend these programs.

Adler is indeed aware of the possible individual differences that might ezist between children, but he nevertheless has decided to ignore human differences because he wishes to emphasize "the sameness that underlie the differences."[34] But some people may choose to emphasize the differences that underlie the sameness. And for those who make this choice the Paideia Proposal is doomed to be viewed as extremely inadequate partly because of Adler's lack of respect, appreciation, and toleration for those parts of a person which make us all unique individuals.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Excerpts from this paper were read during the 1983 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Philosophy of Education Society at the University of Chicago on November 11, 1983. This essay was prepared for a symposium on Mortimer Adler's Paideia Proposal. Also, at this time I would like to thank Susan Swartz, Robert Stern, and Joseph Agassi for the criticisms they offered for an earlier draft of this essay. Although none of these individuals necessarily endorses any of the arguments in this essay, I am grateful for the interest they have shown in my work.

[2]Aristotle, The Politics, trans, T.A. Sinclair (New York: Penguin Books, 1977), p. 299.

[3]Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Education" in The Portable Emerson, ed. Mark Van Doren (New York: The Viking Press Inc., 1974), p. 256

[4]Mortimer J. Adler, Reforming Education (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1977), pp. 61-73.

[5]Ibid., p. 62.

[6]Protagoras as quoted in J.B. Bury, A History of Greece to the Death of Alexander the Great (New York: Random House, Inc., 1900), p. 371.

[7]Mortimer J. Adler, The Paideia Proposal New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1982), p. 82.

[8]Ibid., p. 21.

[9]Ibid., p. 21.

[10]Ibid., p. 5.

[11]Plato, The Republic, trans, Francis MacDonald Cornford (New York: Oxford University Press, 1945), p. 69.

[12]See W.K.C. Guthrie, The Greek Philosophers from Thales to Aristotle (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1950), pp. 125-144.

[13]Aristotle, The Politics, p. 296.

[14]See the following: Mortimer J. Adler, Aristotle for Everybody (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1978), and Mortimer J. Adler, The Conditions of Philosophy (New York: Antheneum, 1965).

[15]Mortimer J. Adler, Aristotle for Everybody, p.x.

[16]For references which explain in detail my view on the policy of expert authority and conventional schools see the following: Ronald Swartz, "Educational as Entertainment and Irresponsibility in the Classroom," Science Education, Vol. 58, No. 1 (January-March 1974); Ronald Swartz, "Schooling and Responsibility", Science Education, Vol. 59, No. 3 (July - September, 1975); Ronald Swartz, "Responsibility, Reading and Schooling," The Elementary School Journal, Vol. 77, No. 1 (September, 1976), pp. 5-11; Ronald Swartz, "Toward a Liberal View of Educational Authorities," Teachers College Record, Vol. 78, No. 4 (May, 1977), pp. 413-436; Ronald Swartz, "On Granting Academic Freedom to Students," The High School Journal, Vol. 61, No. 2 (November, 1977), pp. 70-91; Ronald Swartz, "Liberalism, Radicalism, and Self-Governing Ronald Swartz, "Authority, Responsibility and Democratic Schooling" in Ronald Swartz, Henry Perkinson, and Stephenie Edgerton, Knowledge and Fallibilism (New York; New York University Press, 1980), pp. 131-148; Ronald Swartz, "Alternative Learning Strategies as Part of the Educational Process," Science Education, Vol. 66, No. 2, (February, 1982), pp. 269-270; Ronald Swartz, "Joyn Dewey and Homer Lane: "The Odd Couple" Among the Educational Theorists," The Journal of Educational Thought, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Dec., 1982), pp. 181-190; Ronald Swartz, "Homer Lane's Lost Influence on Western Educational Thought," Focus on Learning, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1983), pp. 56-62.

[17]Mortimer J. Adler, The Paideia Proposal, p. 54.

[18]Mortimer J. Adler, The Paideia Proposal, p. 2.

[19]Ibid., p. 8.

[20]Plato, Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, trans. F. J. Church (New York: Bobbs-Merril Co., Inc., 1956), p. 28.

[21]Ibid., p. 26.

[22]Bertrand Russell, Sceptical Essays, pp. 144-145.

[23]Bertrand Russell, Education and the Social Order (London: Unwin Paperbacks, 1980), p. 21.

[24]See the references in footnote fifteen.

[25]See A. S. Neill, Summerhill; A Radical Approach to Child Rearing (New York: Hart Publishing Co., 1960), p. 4.

[26]A. S. Neill, Summerhill, p. 5.

[27]Ibid., pp. 45-55

[28]Albert Einstein, Out of My later Years (New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1950), pp. 35-36.

[29]See the reference in footnote twelve.

[30]See the following: Ronald Swartz, "Liberalism and Imaginative Educational Reforms" in Ronald Swartz, et al., Knowledge and Fallibilism, pp. 59-75: Mary Anne Raywid, "Restoring School Efficacy by Giving Parents a Choice," Educational Leadership, Vol. 38, No. 2 (November, 1980), pp. 134-137.

[31]Mark Twain, The Adventures of Tom Sawyer (New York: The World Publishing Co., 1946), pp. 298-299.

[32]See the reference in footnote three. 33. See the reference in footnote two. 34. Mortimer J. Adler, Paideia Proposal, p. 45.

Classical Living and Classical Learning
The Search for Equity and Excellence in Education

by
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November, 1983

We want to talk about two sharply contrasting movements within American education. The first is concerned with equity, the desire for justice, fairness, or even mercy. From this motive people have argued for universal schooling, remedial training and special provisions for the handicapped. In modern times these programs have been rooted in the liberal democratic tradition, a tradition that defines freedom or liberty in terms of equality, and sees the promise of democracy as attainable only when the advantages available to one are the advantages available to all. The second movement is concerned with excellence, the desire to achieve the highest degree of human perfection. With this perspective our schools are more susceptible to criticism. Studies like A Nation at Risk seem to provide evidence that American education is in a state of intellectual and moral decline. The fear is not that educators are without standards or that they are ignorant of these standards, but simply that they lack the courage or the will to enforce them. The modern roots of this second movement lie within the conservative democratic traditional, a tradition and emphasizes individual freedom and responsibility. It is assumed by this tradition that the only way to produce a good person or a good society is to have high expectations and to demand that these expectations be met through independent, individual effort.

Undoubtedly these two characterizations are very rough. For more precise descriptions we would need to go to the shelves of the modern academic library, especially to the section on Western social and political theory. But these characterizations should suffice for two purposes: to remind us of the long and acrimonious debate over what are conflicting tendencies in democracy, and to give us some clue as to why education would so often be the battleground. The liberal thinks equality is a condition of dignity, respect and appropriate learning, and that achievement is a consequence. The conservative thinks the reverse. The conservative would say that the liberal promotes mediocrity. The liberal would say that the conservative promotes elitism.

If it is possible to mediate this dispute, it is certainly not easy. So, we should greet with cheer Mortimer Adler's Paideia Proposal and its stated concern for excellence as real achievement consistent with a Deweyan conception of equity as democracy. The thrust of the program by now should be familiar. It has "as its main recommendation a single-track K-12 curriculum for all public school students. The single-track is believed necessary because presumedly it represents the only way we can guarantee uniformly high quality education for all children. Each student must meet the same educational objectives. These objectives are: 1) to develop the capability for personal growth and self-improvement--mental, moral, and spiritual; 2) to be adequately prepared for discharging the duties and responsibilities of citizenship; and 3) to have the basic skills that are common to all kinds of work in our society. To achieve these objectives the Paideia Proposal states

that teaching and learning must occur within three distinct modes: 1) the use of lectures, textbooks, and other aids, or what Adler calls 'didactic instruction,' to enable students to acquire organized bodies of knowledge; 2) the use of coaching exercise, and supervised practice to enable the students to develop intellectual skills such as reading, writing, speaking, listening, calculating, problem-solving and the exercise of critical judgment; and 3) the use of maieutic or Socratic questioning and the active discussion of primary sources, works of art, and engaging in artistic activities to enlarge the understanding of human ideas and values."[1]

The uniformly high quality education promised by the program is necessary, according to Adler, to bring to fruition the educational obligations of a democracy."[2] Democracy requires equality of quality as well as equality of quantity or amount. Sharing in the same quality of life is the innermost meaning of social equality and, therefore, the innermost meaning of democracy.[3]

This is why Adler believes excellence is so important; he sees it as essential for equity.

Educational excellence, for Adler, means having a good mind, a mind that knows important things from rigorous and disciplined study. How does a mind become good? Through working relationships with other minds that are already good. The minds to be used as exemplary are those that epitomize Western culture. The curriculum is whatever these great minds have produced in fields like art, music, literature, history, science and mathematics. But there is nothing essential about these fields. What is

important is that the student compare his or her own insight with the very best, and at some point to actually partake of the creative process that generates knowledge. Whether knowledge is produced or merely reproduced, the student will have applied reason critically through all possible mediums and will know important things, i.e., the student will have a good mind. This is what Adler means by quality education and he is adamant that it represents a precondition of equity.

The question now is, how likely is it that the Paideia Proposal would help us attain our twin objectives of equity and excellence? Our strategy in answering this question is to begin by citing an historical example of a society in which excellence was well understood and its effects on all citizens recognized, an example that Adler himself would respect. The example is fifth century Athens. It is fairly well known that the Athenian Greeks of this time paid a lot of attention to excellence. What is not so well known are the circumstances that made this emphasis possible.

There were basically two factors. First, the Athenians were the inheritors of a rich, heroic literature in the form of the Iliad and the Odyssey. Second, there was a strong, unified, dynamic sense of community that gave this literature a home, and accepted it as an important source of inspiration and learning. Alisdair MacIntyre, in his book After Virtue, provides an exceptionally articulate picture of what life was like in the world of the Iliad and the Odyssey.

> (E)very individual has a given role and status within a well-defined and highly determinate system of roles and statuses . . . . In such a society a man knows who he is by knowing his role in these structures; and in knowing this he also knows what he owes and what

> is owed to him by the occupant of every other role and status . . . . But it is not just that there is for each status a prescribed set of duties and privileges. There is also a clear understanding of what actions are required to perform these and what actions fall short of what is required. For what are required are actions (our emphasis). A man in a heroic society is what he does . . . . To judge a man therefore is to judge his actions. By performing actions of a particular kind in a particular situation a man gives warrant for judgement upon his virtues and vices; for the virtues just are those qualities which sustain a free man in his role and which manifest themselves in those actions which his role requires.[4]

Their relative proximity to this world made it possible for the Athenians to retain a good feel for what were the standards of performance. They could recognize courage, friendship and fate; they knew when a poem was read well, or a play acted well; they could even agree when a horse had run as it should in a race, or a weapon had performed as it should in a fight. But this was due to more than closeness of culture. It was also due to education, to the fact that definite roles with requisite actions were a regular feature of a conscious and preconscious life. The knowledge, judgments, and performances were, relative to our own time, community property; they were part of a world shared.

The presence within a community of deeply and extensively shared values is essential for the display of excellence. The Greek word "polis" is usually translated "city-state." But in his highly regarded volume on early Greek life, H. D. F. Kitto says that this "is a bad translation because the normal polis was not much like a city; and very much more than a state."[5] The polis was a unified, dynamic, and organic community defined by its size (roughly 5000-20,000), its center as a military rallying point (the acropolis), its small scale and total self-sufficiency, its relative isolation due to Greece's hill-valley

topography, and by the Greek character which defined community as a kind of government that "made it possible for a member to appeal to all his fellow-citizens in person . . . ."[6] According to Kitto,

> . . . polis was a living community, based on kinship, real or assumed--a kind of extended family, turning as much as possible of life into family life. . . . This it is that explains not only the polis but also much of what the Greek made and thought, that he was essentially social. In the winning of his livelihood he was essentially individualistic; in the fulfilling of his life he was essentially 'communist.' Religion, art, games, and discussion of things--all of these were needs of life that could be fully satisfied only through the polis--not, as with us, through voluntary associations of like-minded people, or through entrepreneurs appealing to individuals.[7]

When we realize how many of the necessary, interesting, and exciting activities of life the individual Greek citizen enjoyed through the polis, all of them in the open air, within sight of the same acropolis, with the same ring of mountains or the sea visibly enclosing the life of every member of the state, we can begin to understand the depth and extent of the community that then existed.

We know that this community began to come apart towards the end of the fifth century. The writing of Plato and Aristotle make this abundantly clear. The point is that the capacity to judge the worth of any action in a rational and significant manner presupposes a context of shared values, a common understanding of better and worse, and an opportunity for everyone affected to discuss and critique community events. Only to this degree can there be an understanding of quality and the good life that would make it possible to achieve excellence.

Is Adler working in a situation that can bring forth an acceptable set of standards? MacIntyre's characterization of the current state of

our culture would indicate that he is not. After reviewing the diversity in contemporary moral philosophy MacIntyre concludes by saying that there is a general incommensurability among both standards and arguments for standards. A catalog of the great names from our past, names like Aristotle, Bismarck, Calusewitz, Machiavelli, Marx, Fichte, Locke, Kant, Saint Thomas, T. H. Green, Rousseau, and Adam Smith, is revealing of the range and heterogeneity of our moral tradition.

> The surface rhetoric of our culture is apt to speak complacently of moral pluralism in this connection, but the notion of pluralism is too imprecise. For it may equally well apply to an ordered dialogue of intersecting viewpoints and to an unharmonious melange of ill-assorted fragments. The suspicion . . . that it is the latter with which we have to deal is heightened when we recognize that all those various concepts which inform our moral discourse were originally at home in larger totalities of theory and practice in which they enjoyed a role and function supplied by contexts of which they have not been deprived.[8]

In the course of his book MacIntyre converts this suspicion into a powerfully reasoned and well documented narrative that has the effect of creating numerous problems for Adler's educational outlook. If moral theory and culture are fragmented in the way MacIntyre contends, what is there to say that the Paideia Proposal is not itself just another capricious ideology? Even assuming that it is not, that it represents a real concern for excellence, why should we believe that in a society such as ours, which is so much unlike that of ancient Greece, where there are virtually no common values, goals, or practices, excellence will be understood in terms outside of a lust for power and domination?

These are serious concerns. But perhaps we should give Adler some ground here. Suppose we were to agree that excellence in education is something that we have been inclined to ignore in recent time, and that

Adler has helped us realize that we can and must do something about his. Has he shown a similar concern for equity? Certainly, many would content that Adler does not talk about equity with the same intensity, the same sense of imminent loss, that he exhibits in his talk about excellence. But he would surely maintain that he does not under-value equity, and perhaps even, that there is nothing more important than equity. He has quoted Hutchins that "the best education for the best is the best education for all," and again, like Hutchins, insists that the pursuit of excellence is the pursuit of equity. Most persuasive of all, Adler states that his program for educational excellence would produce the kind of equity envisioned by John Dewey in his book, Democracy and Education. If it does, there could be little doubt that Adler has achieved a compatibility of values that has been the goal of philosophers and educators for at least the past two hundred years.

Is this program compatible with what Dewey has in mind? Dewey defined a democratic community as having two generic traits. First, there must be numerous and varied interests that are consciously shared. Second, there must be a full and free interplay with other forms of association, something that can be realized by interaction and cooperative intercourse with other groups.[9] Dewey goes on to say that "the realization of a form of social life in which interests are mutually interpenetrating, and where progress, or readjustment, is an important consideration, makes a democratic community more interested than other communities have cause to be in deliberate and systematic education."[10] Education is essential for a democratic community

because it provides the mechanism, interaction and cooperative intercourse, for finding that developing the consciously shared interests that will maximize and unify growth.

Now, how does Adler's program measure up to this? At one point it would seem to be somewhat shallow. Adler's initial argument for linking education and democracy is that the wo--universal schooling and universal suffrage--are "inextricably bound together." "The one without the other is a perilous delusion. Suffrage without schooling produces mobocracy, not democracy--not rule of law, not constitutional government by the people as well as for them."[11] Dewey calls this a "superficial explanation" of the devotion of democracy to education.[12] A deeper sense of this relationship is found in his articulation of democracy as a way of life.

> A democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, a conjoint communicated experience. The extension of space of the number of individuals who participate in an interest so that each has to refer his own actions to that of others, and to consider the action of others to give point and direction to his own, is equivalent to the breaking down of those barriers of class, race, and national territory which keep men form perceiving the full import of their activity. These more numerous and more varied points of contact denote a greater diversity of stimuli to which an individual has to respond; they consequently put a premium on variation in his action. They secure a liberation of powers which remain suppressed as long as the incitations to action are partial, as they must be in a group which in its exclusiveness shuts out many interests.[13]

Equity in this sense requires access. It means that the pursuit of interests is never a purely personal or private affair. There is nothing unilateral, hierarchical or fixed. Education equates, by deliberately working to sustain and extend these comings and goings.

Adler's program is not without a fair amount of give and take in this regard. Teachers coaching and supervising the verbal exchanges necessary for maieutic questioning; students practicing and evaluating the knowledge that leads to understanding; these are all highly energetic activities. The study of history, mathematics, language, literature, science, art and music also provides an impressive variety of pursuits. Furthermore, the presence of a common curriculum guarantees a certain amount of sharing. but is this the kind of education that is designed to identify and develop interests, or is it the kind of education that will merely present and impose interests? The emphasis on a single-track, highly structured (formalized), cognitive curriculum not only nints that equity, in Dewey's sense, will not be achieved, but also hints that excellence as a way of life defined by superior achievement across a full range of human activities will be unattainable too. Classical living and Dewey's modern community both say that there is more to living the quality life than classical learning.

In a recent response to critics of the Paideia Proposal Adler uses a metaphor to express what he sees as the relation in education between quality and equity.[14] Children, he says, come with various intellectual capacities. There are, so to speak, pint size, quart size, and gallon size intellects. What the present system tends to do is put dirty water in the pint size, skim milk in the quart size, and rich cream in the gallon. This amounts to restricting the best education for the best and lesser education for the rest. Is this not the grossest kind of inequity, Adler asks? He proposes that we put the best we have got, rich

cream in all the containers. Then each container would be equally full. This is equity, Adler says. But notice, it is equity produced as a function of excellence, rather than the other way around.

What is there to say for this metaphor? For one thing, it is hard to deny that intellectual capacities differ; so do other human capacities. And it would certainly seem as if educators could rarely do more than help students attain their potential as defined by the limits of their capabilities. But is it helpful to think of equity in education on the model of equally full containers of different sizes? As Adler admits, the difference between intellects which are equally filled to the brim with quality or excellence, is a quantitative difference, not a qualitative one. He sees this as an argument for democracy. And on one level it is, since without qualitative differences there is no rational basis for claiming differences of kind, type, or class. The objective foundation for all hierarchies is dissolved. But on another level this argument is a threat to democracy, and, when seen in the past as part of democracy's essence, has actually been used as an argument against it.

The problem is that, quantitative differences are still differences. And there is a tendency in all of us to convert these differences in degree into qualitative distinctions, and to do this in accord with our irrational and unobjective preferences. When this occurs actions are inevitably rationalized on unadulterated power, a power that will eventually destroy equity. To insist on fixed differences between the size of the containers of intellect is to lend support to this tendency to dominate and control.

Distinctions of worth founded on merely quantitative difference are always arbitrary. Where there are no kinds, types, or classes, noting a difference means choosing somewhere on a continuum whatever one feels like calling a difference. Of course, a consensus of arbitrary decision is always possible. But it does not follow that these decisions rest on rational or objective standards. An example from educational research might be helpful here. In order to show that research is important, useful or real, it is necessary to show a significant difference between the effects of the treatment and the effects of the control variables. But the concept of significance in educational research is a statistical one; it is based on a quantitative distribution of chance recurring events. Along this open-ended continuum events with a 0.001 probability of occurrence are more rare than events with a 0.05 probability of occurrence, which are more rare than events with a 0.75 probability of occurrence. But who is to say which of these probabilities refer to events that are really rare, and thus really significant, from a statistical viewpoint, such that the rest of us should read about these events in our journals and apply the findings from their study in our classrooms? There simply are no rational or objective grounds for deciding whether research is significant. So, as the result of a convention--a consensus of personal, arbitrary decisions--we now have the famous, though no less arbitrary, 0.05 level of significance. The decisions we might make about a child's worth as a result of quantifiable differences in intellectual capacity are equally arbitrary. It is hard to see in this how we would be promoting either equity or excellence.

this problem of quantitative differences leads back to our initial concern: Does the Paideia Proposal satisfactorily reconcile the values of equity and excellence? With an imperfect treatment of equity and a fractured understanding of excellence, it would seem most unlikely. At the same time we do not want to dismiss the Paideia Proposal. It addresses important issues in a crucial period, and it is certainly inspired by genuine humanistic aims. In the last decade or so, perhaps reflecting the attitude of the larger society, those of us in education, and particularly in philosophy of education, have often ignored a truly rational approach to the study of these aims, appearing to be satisfied with the refinement of means alone. Of this preoccupation with professional expertise Adler and the other members of the Paideia Group are not guilty. Perhaps their ideas simply require a little more work, or need better articulation. Whatever this involves it will surely include the outcomes of daring intellectual speculation as well as the results of the ongoing efforts to test these ideas in practice.

Footnotes

[1]Philip L. Smith and Rob Traver, "program and Prophecy: The Fate of General Studies in Teacher Education," Educational Theory, 33 (2), pp. 73-7.

[2]Mortimer Adler, The Paideia Proposal (New York: Macmillan, 1982), p. 4.

[3]Ibid., p. 6.

[4]Alisdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), p. 115.

[5]H. D. F. Kitto, The Greeks (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, Ltd., revised, 1956), p. 64.

[6]Ibid., p. 72.

[7]Ibid., pp. 78-9.

[8]MacIntyre, op. cit., p. 10.

[9]John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York: The Free Press, 1916), pp. 86-7.

[10]Ibid., p. 87.

[11]Adler, op. cit., p. 3.

[12]In John Dewey's words: "The devotion of democracy to education is a familiar fact. The superficial explanation is that a government resting upon popular suffrage cannot be successful unless those who elect and who obey their governors are educated. Since a democratic society repudiates the principle of external authority, it must find a substitute in voluntary disposition and interest; these can be created only by education." Op. cit., p. 87.

[13]Ibid., p. 87.

[14]Mortimer Adler, Paideia Problems and Possibilities (New York: Macmillan, 1983).

Disbelief in the Classroom: Second Thoughts

by
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In a paper[1] I read at the 1983 PES meeting I tried to establish the following points about a not uncommon classroom phenomenon, a teacher telling a student that she does not believe him:

1. Disbelief is not the same as belief. "I do not believe that x" is not the same as "I believe that not-x."

2. For this reason, the epistemological conditions justifying disbelief are not the same as those that would justify belief but are rather the much stronger conditions that are needed to justify the claim that one knows.

3. Furthermore, the moral conditions that would justify disbelief are only to be found in a complex pedagogical and dialogical movement leading, hopefully, to reform on the student's part.

I am still convinced that these points are worth making. In the discussion which followed presentation of the paper, however, I found that I was unable to handle certain objections which arose. Professor Nell Noddings wished to maintain, with Quine and Ullian, that belief and disbelief are not different as epistemic acts. She also saw my examples of disbelief as something quite different; namely, as acts expressing distrust of another rather than as sentences expressing disbelief. I had trouble trying to differentiate "I do not believe that x" from "I believe that not-x." Both of these sentences seemed, that afternoon, to have

exactly the same truth conditions. Obviously, too, there is an element of distrust, which I wished to acknowledge, without, however, being willing to give up the epistemic element which I saw also involved in the utterance. I did not have at my finger-tips the technical analysis to ground that wish of mine.

Roi Daniels reminded me that belief, like knowledge, is not an act, but, as Scheffler and others have pointed out, something rather closer to a disposition. Daniels was obviously correct; belief as an habitual stance with regard to some state of affairs is dispositional in nature. And yet the utterances I was analyzing were actions. This I wished to maintain, but again the technical analysis needed to ground that stance was not apparent to me.

After a period of reading and reflection, I am now prepared to furnish the technical grounds for my assertions in a way that not only, in my opinion, handles the objections but furnishes a basis for the analysis of a wider set of pedagogical statements.

In what follows I will use the following resources:

1. Hintikka on statements as contrasted with sentences.
2. Language theorists who take the domains of discourse, such as insults, protests, apologies, as the fundamental units of discourse.
3. R. M. Hare on illocutionaries.
4. John Lyons on negation.

With their help I believe that I can show that disbelief is indeed different from belief (and from doubt); that the conditions,

epistemological and moral, grounding the legitimacy of disbelief are exceedingly difficult to meet but not impossible; and that disbelief constitutes but a moment within a larger discourse or speech-act.

I

That philosophers of education are concerned about happenings in a classroom immediately influences the level of analysis that they conduct. In a classroom statements are made, not sentences. For this reason, the analysis of Hintikka is most apt:

> A statement is an event of a certain kind while a sentence is not. More explicitly, a statement is the act of uttering writing, or otherwise expressing a declarative sentence (and is normally addressed to a certain person). A sentence is the form of words which is uttered or written when a statement is made. In order to specify a statement one has to specify the occasion on which it was uttered or written and to specify the speaker or writer. A sentence is specified by specifying the words of which it consists and their order.[2]

A statement is incorrigibly context-dependent. A sentence may have sense and reference, but that is all. A statement is embedded in a larger context, and it is but one of possibly several constituent parts of the larger unit.

This basic distinction between statement and sentence furnishes the basis for my reply to Noddings and Daniels. A sentence is a contextless abstraction. Like a chameleon, it takes its color from its surroundings. As an assemblage of words, it is partially determined but not wholly determined. Thus the sentence "John believes that x" can very well be taken as evidence of John's possessing a disposition to act in a certain way when a certain set of conditions arises. But the teacher who

in a classroom says to a student, "I do not believe that you wrote the paper you turned in," is not only the possessor of a disposition. At that particular moment, the teacher is acting in accord with a disposition, or, and this is more likely, acting in such a way that she is beginning to form a disposition. The sentence as statement functions quite differently from a simple dispositional statement. Thus I would reply to Roi Daniels. For a statement incorporates a sentence into a context which further determines its meaning and changes it from an abstract sentence to an act: a statement is made. But again statements are parts of a larger context, and we must now follow this lead.

That larger context is a domain of discourse. Linguistic analysts and developmental psychologists have been investigating many domains of discourse to determine their "grammatical" sequence. Erving Goffman, for example, has analyzed the moves governing that domain of discourse called a "remedial interchange."

Since the statement of a teacher's disbelief is embedded in a discourse closely related to a "remedial interchange," let us look more closely at Goffman's analysis.

A possibly offensive act is accompanied by some remedial activity. Traditionally, a crime is followed by a trial and the inflicting of punishment. But other remedial interchanges are possible, Instead of a trial, the violator, on being challenged, through direct accusation or subtler forms of disapproval, may remedy the situation by explaining it away, wholly or in part, or by apologizing. The upshot is some assurance to the offended that the act will not occur again. Another possibility

is that the violator, before the offense takes place, requests permission so to act, for he is aware that the act will involve sufferance on the part of the "offended." Some reply is called forth as a response to the remedy proposed; Goffman calls it "relief." It in turn is followed ordinarily by an "appreciation," a recognition that the remedial act has been completed. Thus an offense is followed by a challenge which is followed by a remedy (or defiance or no response). The remedy is followed by relief (or by a simple ending which does not indicate acceptance) and by an appreciation (or by silence).[3] Other examples of similar investigations are Mishler's examination of question-answer routines,[4] the Smith-Meux analyses of episodic discourse in the classroom,[5] and Sedlak and Walton's analysis of the sequence of conversational moves in discourse about transgressions.[6]

Noddings had charged me with unnecessary cruelty in allowing the teacher, on those rare occasions when disbelief could be epistemologically justified, to express her disbelief to a student. Noddings was sure that and accusatory stance could never be morally justified. But I would maintain, using Goffman's remedial exchange as a model, that there are occasions--such as flagrant cases of cheating or plagiarizing--when the frank recognition of such activities, grounded in an atmosphere of fairness and willingness to forgive, is an apt means for bringing about a clearing of the air, a restoration of honest exchange, and a willingness to let the past be past. Only if one places the teacher's act of disbelief in this larger context can it be morally justified and recommended.

It is, then, important that we see teachers' acts of disbelief in the context of ongoing teaching in a classroom. If we do not, we reduce the richness of the encounter to a series of sentences that, having lost their context, are easily treated as interchangeable tokens. The sentence, "I do not believe that the water level of Lake Superior is four feet lower than last year's level," is not identical with the utterance of a teacher who makes that statement in reply to a little girl who, in reporting on her vacation last summer, has just said, "The water in Lake Superior is four feet lower than it was last summer and is causing many difficulties for people along the shore." That they are epistemologically different seems clear. Precisely how are they different? That is the question we address ourselves to.

II

We are, then, speaking of statements, not sentences, as parts of complex discourses. We have left analyses of belief and disbelief as dispositions far behind. We are in the realm of speech-acts. But even in the realm of sentences certain complexities arise which strengthen the contention that belief and disbelief are not simply two kinds of belief. Let us look at some recent work on practical inferences by R. M. Hare.

Hare, following a lead from Frege and Russell, has unravelled some of the complexities that are inherent in any sentence x. He distinguishes between the phrastic, the tropic, and the neustic parts of a sentence. The phrastic is that part of a sentence which would be there whether the sentence were declarative, imperative, interrogative, or

conditional. It corresponds to the sentence's propositional content (what can be paraphrased). Thus each of the following four sentences has the same propositional content:

1. The student is sitting at his desk.
2. Let the student sit at his desk.
3. Is the student sitting at his desk?
4. If the student is sitting at his desk, then . . . .

The tropic is that part of the sentence which tells us what kind of a speech-act this sentence is used to perform; that is to say, the manner in which it is to be taken. It is the sign of mood or "dictor." Thus the sentence is used to state a fact, give a command, ask a question, or hypothesize.

The neustic is Hare's "sign of subscription" and corresponds to the Frege-Russell assertion sign. "It is that part of the sentence which expressed the speaker's commitment to the factuality, desirability, etc. of the propositional contect conveyed by the phrastic."[7] For the speaker may be asserting the proposition, offering it without comment for the listener's consideration, or dissociating himself from the proposition.[8]

Thus in utterances of belief and disbelief the component parts of an utterance can be and should be distinguished. "I believe that the student is sitting at his desk." This sentence has three components: (1) the phrastic: the student sitting at his desk; (2) the tropic: the sign of the declarative mood which signifies that the student <u>is</u> sitting at his desk; (3) the neustic: the degree of subscription to that declaration; namely, that "I believe" the statement.

Another example, a negative one, shows these distinctions very clearly.

1. John dislikes reading.
2. John does not dislike reading.
3. I do not believe that John dislikes reading.

In (1) the phrastic is negative. In (2) the tropic is also negative. In (3) the neustic is negative. What makes this kind of analysis somewhat difficult to handle is that every utterance is tri-partite. Thus in (1) the phrastic is negative, but the tropic is affirmative as is the neustic. In (2) the phrastic is negative, and the tropic is negative, but the neustic is affirmative. In (3) the phrastic and the neustic are negative but the tropic is affirmative. Subtleties, however fine, do not necessarily mean trifles. As I shall attempt to show, this distinction clarifies in an important way expressions of disbelief in the classroom.

III

But before I do, we need one more building block for the argument. Negation is a topic that investigators have seized on and is presently characterized by rapid development and some degree of confusion.[9]

Let us begin with what is clear. The negative of propositional logic is not capacious enough to handle all negations. In propositional logic the negative of p is not-p. But let us ask: In modal logic is the negative of nec p (it is necessary that p) not nec p (it is not necessary that p) or nec not-p (it is necessary that not-p)? That is, does the negative affect the modal proposition externally or internally? Put

another way, not nec not-p (it is not necessary that not-p) is not equivalent to nec p; for two negatives do not make a positive in modal logic as they do in propositional logic. Rather not nec not-p is equivalent to poss p (it is possible that p). The modality shifts from necessity to possibility. A similar problem arises with illocutionary acts. Is the negative of "I promise to turn in my homework" "I don't promise to turn in my homework" or "I promise not to turn in my homework"? Note that only the second negative possibility is an illocutionary act of promising; the first possibility is an illocutionary act of asserting, namely, "I don't promise." The upshot is that we need several negatives if our analyses of negations are to be correct and comprehensive. So much is clear.

What is only fairly clear?

(1) There ought to be three different kinds of negation, one that negates the neustic, another that negates the tropic, a third that negates the phrastic element. The context-free "not-p" is not the equivalent of the context-bound "I deny that p is so." The first involves propositional negation; the second, modal negation; both have a positive neustic. The negation of the neustic is a refusal or inability to perform the illocutionary act of p; it is the performative act of non-commitment. The negation of the tropic is a denial or rejection of something we might be expected to accept as true. The negation of the phrastic is a negation of the predicate.

(2) Negations are probably of four different kinds, as Lois Bloom has argued.[10] (a) There is the negative of non-existence. A child is

drinking a glass of milk. She finishes, holds up the glass, and says, "no more." (b) There is the negative of rejection. The mother attempts to put a bib on her child. The child pushes it away and says, "no bib." (c) There is the negative of refusal. The mother says to the child, "go to sleep." The child responds, "I don't go sleep." (d) There is the negative of denial. The child asks for a big spoon. The mother brings a spoon. The child says, "It's not a big spoon."

In utterances of non-existence, the negative seems to be tropic. "There is no teddy bear" can be analyzed into: I say so -- it is not so -- teddy-bear. In utterances of refusal, the negative seems to be neustic; the performative is not exactly rejection, and the tropic is jussive. "I don't go sleep" can be analyzed into: I refuse -- let it be so -- go sleep. (Note that the refuser is not the commander.) In utterances of denial, the negative seems propositional. "It's not a big spoon" can be analyzed into: I say so -- it is so -- not a big spoon.

IV

What conclusions do I draw? On the basis of Hare's distinction of phrastic, tropic, and neustic elements in the sentence, "I do not believe that x" is not the equivalent of "I believe that not-x" anymore than "It is not necessary that x" is the equivalent of "It is necessary that non-x." Necessity is a neustic element and not a phrastic element. Similarly disbelief involves not only a phrastic element but also a neustic element.

With less certainty--because the analysis of negation is less certain--I would maintain that "I do not believe that x" is analyzable into "I say so -- it is so -- not-x," an act of assertion rather than into "I say so -- it may quite probably be so -- not-x" which is an act of opinion.

But, as in almost any good philosophical discussion, Professor Noddings could suggest that an alternate analysis is possible. For Noddings could maintain the equivalency of "I don't believe that x" and "I believe that not-x" as a case of transferred negation. As Quirk et al. say, transferred negation, "The transfer of the negative from a subordinate that-clause, where semantically it belongs, to the main clause" is a strange but fairly common phenomenon in colloquial English. For example, it would seem that "I don't believe (that) you've paid for it yet" has as its equivalent "I believe that you have not paid for it yet." The non-assertive yet would also indicate that the subordinate clause is negative. Although, as Quirk remarks, "not all verbs in the semantic field of belief, uncertainty, etc. take transferred negation," a great number seem to.[11] Thus, it would seem that disbelief is indeed identical with belief.

There are, however, some problems with this analysis. John Lyons, analyzing the statement, "I don't think he'll do it," maintains that

> the verb 'think' is not being used descriptively, in a constative utterance. As in 'I think he'll do it,' it is being used to qualify the speaker's commitment to the truth of 'he will do it.' . . . What all this suggests is that 'I don't think he'll do it' exemplifies something that is closer to, if not identical with, performative negation. Looked at from a purely semantic point of view, it has an obvious connexion with subjective epistemic modality. However that may be, the notion of transferred negation

is by no means as straightforward as it is frequently supposed to be.[12]

If, moreover, with Quirk[13] we see that the prefix "dis-" may be a negative or reversative, privative prefix, we are open to understand "not believe" as a refusal to believe in or a rejection of what someone has said. Then "I do not believe that x" has as its equivalents "I reject that x" and "I assert that not-x."

V

One last rejoinder. Professor Noddings is correct in pointing out that the classaroom situations I have described involve trust or lack of trust by the teacher of the student. She infers that I am using "belief" and "disbelief" in a quite different sense from that which Quine is using, a propositional sense. Noddings would say that his seem to be much more straightforwardly propositions. Thus "I do not believe you" is different from "I do not believe that x." I believe that Noddings is mistaken in her inference that trust is propositionless.

The logician Bochenski provides us with a way of justifying my position. A general methods of indirect justification follows the form:

1. Whenever P has a certain contextual property phi, then P is true.
2. P possesses the property phi.
3. Therefore, P is true.

A more particular form would be:

4. Whenever a person A asserts P, then P is true.
5. A asserts P.
6. Therefore, P is true.

How is the fourth statement justified? By the insight called "trust" which supposes that (a) A knows the situation in the field in which A is an authority, and (b) A speaks truthfully about the elements of that field to the subject.

Then, in a concrete situation the following occurs:

7. For all P, if A says P, then P is true.

8. A says P.

9. P is true.[14]

There is, therefore, propositional content in the domain of discourse, though Noddings is right in saying that trust, like belief, can also be a disposition which has, at most times, only potential content.

VI

I have made a distinction in the latter part of this paper between what is clear and what is less clear. I have done so precisely because in philosophical argument not all arguments have equal weight and also because arguments like conversations end but only for the time being. They can be taken up again and again because weaker arguments gain new support or are weak points deserving of closer inspection and possibly rejection. Having made this demurrer, let me now clarify and summarize my argument:

(1) Disbelief functions differently from belief in classroom discourse. It threatens the community-atmosphere of the classroom; it brings to a halt the on-going sharing of material of common interest.[15]

(2) Because it is both the rejection of another's utterance and an assertion of the negation of the phrastic, it must meet the requirements for "knowing" something rather than for merely "believing" something. Disbelief is much more than an alternate belief.

(3) Morally such an act can be justified only to the extent that it leads to something analogous to Goffman's "remedial interchange." That is, the students are thereby encouraged to admit their mistakes and take the necessary steps to correct them.

(4) How are belief, disbelief, and doubt, then, to be distinguished? Belief is tropical: I say so -- it may quite probably be so -- that x. Disbelief is phrasitc: I say so -- it is so -- that not-x. Doubt is neustic: I do not commit myself -- it is so -- that x.

(5) Finally, it is my hope that similar analyses of other classroom interchanges may lead to a deeper understanding of the complex and varying relationships between teacher and student. In a later paper I hope to show that in the area of disbelief the relation between teacher and student is not symmetrical.

Footnotes

[1]Walter P. Krolikowski, "Boiling Water for Blood: Disbelief in the Classroom," Philosophy of Education: 1983. Proceedings of the Thirty-Ninth Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society, pp. 263-274.

[2]Jaakko Hintikka, Knowledge and Belief. An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 6.

[3]Erving Goffman, Relations in Public. Microstudies of the Public Order (New York: Basic Books, 1971), pp. 95-187.

[4]E. G. Mishler, "Studies in Dialogue and Discourse. I. An Exponential Law of Successive Questioning," Language in Society, 4 (1975, 31-52; "II. Types of Discourse Initiated by and Sustained through Questioning," Journal of Psycholinguistic Research, 4 (1975), 99-121; "III. Utterance Structure and Utterance Function in Interrogative Sequences," Journal of Psycholinguistic Research, 7 (1978), 179-305.

[5]B. Othanel Smith and Milton O. Meux et al., A Study of the Logic of Teaching (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970).

[6]Andrea J. Sedlak and Marsha D. Walton, "Sequencing in Social Repair: A Markov Grammar of Children's Discourse about Transgressions," Developmental Review, 2 (1982), 305-329.

[7]John Lyons, Semantics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 750.

[8]R. M. Hare, Practical Inferences (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 89-93.

[9]For much of this material, I am indebted to Lyons, Semantics, pp. 768-777.

[10]Lois Bloom, Language Development: Form and Function in Emerging Grammars (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1970), pp. 170-220.

[11]Randolph Quirk, Sidney Greenbaum, Geoffrey Leech, and Jan Svartik, A Grammar of Contemporary English (New York: Seminar Press, 1972, pp. 789-790.

[12]Lyons, Semantics, pp. 775-776.

[13]Quirk, Grammar, pp. 982-984.

[14]See Joseph M. Bochenski, The Logic of Religion (New York: New York University Press, 1965), pp. 121-124; 135-139.

[15]For some interesting comments on the nature of conversations, see Dinah Murray, "Conversational Concerns: Issues," Journal of Pragmatics, 7 (1983), 1-15.

Footnotes

[1]Walter P. Krolikowski, "Boiling Water for Blood: Disbelief in the Classroom," Philosophy of Education: 1983. Proceedings of the Thirty-Ninth Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society, pp. 263-274.

[2]Jaakko Hintikka, Knowledge and Belief. An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 6.

[3]Erving Goffman, Relations in Public. Microstudies of the Public Order (New York: Basic Books, 1971), pp. 95-187.

[4]E. G. Mishler, "Studies in Dialogue and Discourse. I. An Exponential Law of Successive Questioning," Language in Society, 4 (1975, 31-52; "II. Types of Discourse Initiated by and Sustained through Questioning," Journal of Psycholinguistic Research, 4 (1975), 99-121; "III. Utterance Structure and Utterance Function in Interrogative Sequences," Journal of Psycholinguistic Research, 7 (1978), 179-305.

[5]B. Othanel Smith and Milton O. Meux et al., A Study of the Logic of Teaching (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970).

[6]Andrea J. Sedlak and Marsha D. Walton, "Sequencing in Social Repair: A Markov Grammar of Children's Discourse about Transgressions," Developmental Review, 2 (1982), 305-329.

[7]John Lyons, Semantics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 750.

[8]R. M. Hare, Practical Inferences (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 89-93.

[9]For much of this material, I am indebted to Lyons, Semantics, pp. 768-777.

[10]Lois Bloom, Language Development: Form and Function in Emerging Grammars (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1970), pp. 170-220.

[11]Randolph Quirk, Sidney Greenbaum, Geoffrey Leech, and Jan Svartik, A Grammar of Contemporary English (New York: Seminar Press, 1972, pp. 789-790.

[12]Lyons, Semantics, pp. 775-776.

[13]Quirk, Grammar, pp. 982-984.

[14]See Joseph M. Bochenski, The Logic of Religion (New York: New York University Press, 1965), pp. 121-124; 135-139.

[15]For some interesting comments on the nature of conversations, see Dinah Murray, "Conversational Concerns: Issues," Journal of Pragmatics, 7 (1983), 1-15.

MIDWEST PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY

Officers:

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Arrangements:

Walter P. Krolikowski	Loyola University of Chicago

Midwest Philosophy of Education Society
Annual Conferences, The University of Chicago
November 11-12, 1983

Business Meeting Minutes (11/11/83)

Old Business

1. The meeting was called to order by President Phil Smith at 5:30 p.m. The minutes of the last meeting and the Treasurer's Report distributed to the membership April 13, 1983 were approved.

2. The President expressed thanks to the officers, the Executive Committee, Lawrence Dennis (1983 Program Chair), and to Walter Krolikowski (1983 Arrangements Chair).

3. The President directed that the Secretary-Treasurer send a letter of appreciation to Professor Charles E. Bidwell, Chairman, Department of Education, The University of Chicago, for his interest in the Society and for his help in securing the University of the 1983 meeting.

4. Professor Michael C. Smith, the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, announced that the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee will pay for the publishing of the 1983 Proceedings. It was noted that the 1981 Proceedings were never published. An effort will be made to contact the presenters at that meeting, so the Proceedings can be eventually published.

5. President Smith reminded the membership of the need for their continued commitment to the Society, and he publicly thanked them for their participation.

New Business

1. A discussion was initiated by President Smith regarding the site for the 1984 meeting. The University of Chicago or Wayne State University were suggested. President Smith will contact Charles Bidwell, and Robert Craig will contact Professor Arthur Brown of Wayne State University.

2. Michael Smith moved that the Secretary-Treasurer send a letter of appreciation to Dean Stolee of the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee for his continued financial support in publishing the Proceedings. President Smith requested the Secretary-Treasurer to send the letter.

3. The need for new membership was again recognized. It was suggested that the Society broaden its appeal to public school teachers and to non-traditional people in education.

4. It was moved, seconded, and passed that the Society contribute $50.00 to Educational Theory.

5. Meeting adjourned at 6:10 p.m.

Respectfully Submitted,
Robert P. Craig

TREASURER'S REPORT

MIDWEST PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY

Balance March 1, 1983	$613.83
1983 dues collected, sale of Proceedings	350.00
Interest earned	41.73
	$1,005.56

Expenses:

University of Chicago meeting, catering, etc.	$100.00	
Educational Theory contribution	50.00	
Program Committee: postage, xerox, etc.	51.35	
		$201.53

Balance March 1, 1984 (in MPES Account No. 56-500677-2, First Federal Savings and Loan Association, Royal Oak, Michigan)

$804.03